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ABSTRACT 
DAWES COOKE: An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Private Security and State Protection in Post-
Soviet Russia 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 
 
 
It is typically the responsibility of governments to safeguard the rights, property, and 
physical safety of its citizens. However, in Russia, as in many other countries, private 
organizations exist which operate as profitable businesses by offering these same 
protections to paying clients. Such organizations generally exist in a niche created by a 
government’s inability or unwillingness to provide such protections and to monopolize the 
provision of them. Yeltsin’s reforms in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse often left small 
businesses unprotected, leading to a rapid growth in the private security industry. However, 
as the central government strengthened and the economy improved under Putin, the 
industry continued to grow at a rapid pace thanks to adaptation by the private security 
industry to changes in demand for protection as well as cooption methods utilized by the 
state security structures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
STATE PROTECTION AND PRIVATE SECURITY IN RUSSIA 
 
 As I exited the Primorskaya Metro Station in Saint Petersburg one summer day, I 
noticed a police car parked along the row of kiosks lining the square in front of the station. 
Two bored policemen leaned against the car and casually scanned the crowd coming and 
going from the metro. Upon closer inspection, however, their uniforms lacked the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs badges that Russian policemen typically wore. In their places were badges 
displaying a shield emblem with the words “Okhrannaya Firma ‘Titan’” emblazoned on top – 
“Protection Firm ‘Titan.’” The symbol matched the sticker that was affixed to the front 
window or door of many shops, businesses, and apartment buildings in the area. The two 
private security guards were employees of the private protection enterprise “Titan,” which 
specializes in physical security for businesses, apartments, cargo, and individuals 
(Okhrannaya Firma Titan, 2010). The two guards themselves, however, were not protecting 
a private entity. Instead, they were contributing to public security by watching the crowd 
around the metro station for anything suspicious. The questions that were raised by this 
situation, such as why the police were not watching the metro station, and why a private 
company was obliged to do it, led directly to the questions asked in this paper. 
 Legal private security firms such as Titan were allowed in a 1992 law passed by the 
Russian Duma. However, this law did not create the private security industry, but introduced 
legal organizations into it. The private security industry, like any other industry, needs both 
supply and demand in order to thrive. Demand for private security increases when people 
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feel that the government is not providing sufficient protection. Supply of security is affected 
partially by the availability of personnel, but primarily by the willingness of the government to 
allow the de-monopolization of its security contract with its citizens and its ability to limit 
private providers of security. Therefore, private security serves as an effective case study 
through which to examine state’s willingness and ability to protect its citizens and to demand 
the loyalty of domestic actors. 
 This paper consists of three chapters. The first two chapters correspond largely with 
Boris Yeltsin’s time as the President of the Russian Federation. In the first chapter, 
privatization, liberalization, and post-Communist state-building theory will serve as the 
starting point from which Russia’s political and economic transformation between 1991 and 
1995 will be examined. In this period, Yeltsin struggled to turn Russia into a democratic, 
free-market system while maintaining his own position against state and non-state actors 
that fought for political influence. Weak property rights, unreliable court systems, faltering 
law enforcement bodies, and lax regulation of the private security industry during this period 
allowed organized crime to capture a large share of the private security market. The second 
chapter covers the period from 1995 until the end of Yeltsin’s term in 1999.  During this time, 
Yeltsin laid the political framework for a strong state system in which the President 
controlled national-level policymaking, although his position was not strong enough for him 
to take full advantage of this framework. As an illustration of the increasing strength of the 
government, a set of 1995 regulation reforms transformed legal private security enterprises 
into entities capable of competing with criminal organizations for clients, as well as laid the 
framework for increasing state control over the private protection industry. The chapter will 
end with a comparison of the state, legal private security firms, and criminal organizations as 
protection providers near the end of the 1990s. 
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 The third chapter corresponds with Vladimir Putin’s first Presidential term. His 
reforms centralized the Russian government’s authority, improved the reliability of state 
protection apparatuses, and reduced tolerance for competition with the state government. 
Although this should theoretically have harmed the private protection industry, it will be 
argued that, by instituting soft power controls over the industry, the state was able to 
transform legal private protection companies from competitors into reserves and allies. This 
relationship in turn allowed the private security industry to thrive in the 2000s. The chapter 
will end with an examination of various significant events during Putin’s first term and their 
effects on the private security industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER I 
COLLAPSE AND REFORM 
Introduction 
The subject of this chapter is the liberalization of the state between 1991 and 1995, 
and the extent to which liberalization weakened the Russian state and allowed a private 
security industry to thrive. The political and economic upheavals that accompanied the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in nearly a decade of state decentralization, in 
which most of the former Soviet State’s functions were de-monopolized and the power of the 
new Russian state was eclipsed by that of private actors. Although the transition from this 
period began in the latter years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, it was under Vladimir Putin’s 
presidency that the predominance of state authority over the private sector was reasserted. 
These trends are well represented in the short history of private security in Russia. 
The creation of legal private security was a direct result of the downsizing of the state, and 
private security firms offered many services that are often considered to be within the state’s 
domain. The existence of private security organizations raises two important questions, 
which will be addressed within the course of this chapter. The first of these is, where does 
demand come from? It will be taken for granted that protection, in all of its forms, is a service 
that people genuinely desire. However, the reason why the government did not adequately 
offer these services, thus allowing private actors to enter the market, will first be determined. 
The second question is, why did the government allow private actors to supply protection, 
normally a central activity of the state? Although the privatization of security outwardly 
resembles the privatization of other aspects of the former Soviet state, it is these two 
considerations that set private security apart.
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Privatization, Reform, and the Post-Communist State 
The formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was expected by many in the 
West to be the transition point at which the former communist countries moved from 
centralized authoritarian states with planned economies to Western-style free-market 
democracies. However, this assumption overlooked the fact that Western countries had 
reached their current models over the course of centuries, whereas former communist states 
were expected to do so in a matter of years and amid the ruins of their former communist 
governments. 
Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong (2002) urge a re-conception of 
what is to be expected in the transition from communism. They argue that traditional 
scholarship has concentrated on political, economic, and civil transition, and ignored the 
process of state building itself. The construction of post-communist states from their 
communist predecessors is different from traditional state-building in that the process is 
rapid (though in many cases incomplete); it is dominated by a number of actors of various 
origin and wielding various sources of power; and it is influenced by international groups that 
often have an ideal societal model that they wish to see implemented. The process of post-
communist state formation, they say, is “elite competition over the authority1
                                                            
1 The term “authority,” when used throughout this paper, will refer to its usage in this definition. 
 to create the 
structural framework through which policies are made and enforced” (Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones Luong, 2002: 531). The state that results from the post-communist transition is a 
result of the exertions of a number of actors, state and non-state, formal and informal, and 
each controlling different and often unequal sources of power (Grzymala-Busse and Jones 
Luong, 2002, 531). The forces struggling for authority in Russia following the Soviet collapse 
will be identified. The arena for this competition was created by a combination of Boris 
Yeltsin’s political and economic reforms, in particular the privatization efforts. 
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Privatization 
During the first half of the twentieth century, mass disillusionment in the benefits of 
capitalism and free enterprise caused by two world wars and a global depression resulted in 
a number of nationalization efforts. If the first half of the twentieth century can be associated 
with nationalization, then the last part can be associated with privatization. William 
Megginson and Jeffry Netter argue that the most important modern privatization effort is that 
undertaken by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in the United Kingdom in the 
1980s, during which a number of large, inefficient, state-run industries were sold to private 
controllers and during which the term “privatization” came into existence to describe what 
was previously referred to as “denationalization” (Megginson and Netter, 2003: 31). 
However, the most dramatic privatization efforts by far accompanied the liberalization of the 
previously state-controlled communist economies, particularly in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union 
Megginson and Netter suggest a number of reasons why nationalization, or in some 
cases the upholding of a pre-existing state monopoly, is attractive. It is often seen as the 
government’s responsibility to own, or at least regulate, natural monopolies, to reduce 
externalities such as pollution, and to provide public goods such as public security, 
transportation, utilities, or education (Megginson and Netter, 2003: 29). Additionally, state 
controlled firms were at one point thought to be more efficient and to provide better for 
society as a whole. However, this opinion has proved not to be true and, in fact, the desire 
to solve the inefficiency problems of state-controlled enterprises was one of the driving 
reasons behind the privatization efforts in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and in the post-
communist states in the 1990s. It seems that state control negates many of the factors that 
induce private firms to operate efficiently. With the assurance that the state will support the 
firm as needed, the firm is not subject to budget discipline and does not have an incentive to 
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compete in the market by producing superior-quality goods and services at lower costs. By 
exposing a firm to market forces, it must either become competitive or shut down and be 
replaced by a firm that will be competitive (Megginson and Netter, 2003: 30). 
Privatization movements tend to happen for these reasons. The desire to combat 
inefficiency is a major one. However, ideological reasons may also produce a shift toward a 
free market, as was the case with Thatcher’s Conservative government. Additionally, the 
sale of state assets produces a great, although one-time, amount of revenue (Megginson 
and Netter, 2003: 32). 
If common motives for privatization can be identified, however, little else is similar 
between the Western privatization efforts and the post-Communist movements. In the 
United Kingdom, as well as in other countries that privatized industries in the twentieth 
century such as Germany and Chile, privatized firms went on to occupy a position in a 
market economy that was already well-defined, and in which they could be subjected to 
preexisting market forces. In transition economies, however, no such markets existed. 
Privatization took place while the market into which these firms would be released was still 
under construction (Hare and Muravyev, 2003: 347). Some exceptions exist – for example, 
criminal or even small legal markets existed alongside the state-controlled Soviet economy - 
but they will be discussed in detail later, after the overall framework of post-Communist 
privatization is established. 
Political Reform 
For many post-Communist states, the difficulty of attempting an economic transition 
is compounded by the uncertainty of undergoing a simultaneous political transition. Russia 
in particular is a prime example. During the early 1990s, two forces were at work 
transforming Russia. The first of these was Boris Yeltsin’s political reforms – that is, 
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restructuring the state. The first step was to dismantle the immense Soviet power structure. 
During the course of his reforms Yeltsin banned the Communist party, and subordinated and 
eventually abolished the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies and the Soviet presidency, 
effectively eliminating the institutionalized sources of state strength. The next step would 
have been to build a new democratic Russian state. However, Michael McFaul argues that 
Yeltsin missed his opportunity to do this. He forwent the construction of new state-
strengthening institutions such as a new constitution, the creation of a new political party, 
and a call of new national elections, likely over the fear that these new democratic 
institutions would oust him and his reformers before the reforms could be completed 
(McFaul 1998: 195). 
Yeltsin instead opted to concentrate first on economic reforms, the second 
transforming force at work in Russia at that time. In order to transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy, old Soviet market controls had to be lifted and the state had 
to relinquish its control over the majority of enterprises. The former was accomplished 
through a number of policies, including the price liberalization, and the latter was 
accomplished through privatization. Most attention was paid during this time to medium and 
large industrial enterprises, the firms that had formed the backbone of the late Soviet 
economy. However, despite efforts to create a wide base of shareholders, control of these 
firms often went to the small number of elites who, at the time of the Soviet collapse, were in 
positions to consolidate control over such enterprises (Hare and Muravyev, 2003: 347-349). 
The democratic institutions of the transitioning Russian state were not strong enough to 
resist the influence of these elites. The result was a system that, in name, was a free 
market, but closely resembled a state-controlled market in some of its negative aspects. The 
Russian oligarchs, as the directors of these large industries came to be called, were able to 
protect their firms from competition and closure by obtaining political privileges, such as tax 
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exemption or import and export permits, rather than direct cash subsidies. In addition, the 
management of these firms largely consisted of the same people who had managed them 
during Soviet times, and who had little understanding of how to run a competitive, profitable 
company (Rutland, 1997). Because the market forces that would have closed 
underperforming firms were weak in the new Russian economy in the first place and 
because many of the largest underperforming firms were protected by their owners from the 
market forces that did exist, the economy stagnated. 
Yeltsin had experienced little resistance from the Russian parliament in disbanding 
the former Soviet institutions and ministries and in lifting controls over the economy. 
However, he began to face opposition in implementing measures to rebuild the economy, 
such as privatization or attempting to raise taxes. His attempts to implement drastic 
stabilization or reform measures were often foiled by the parliament, which backed a more 
modest plan, and in December, 1992, the parliament forced Yeltsin’s Prime Minister, Yegor 
Gaidar, to resign (Rutland, 1997). Facing an impasse concerning the adoption of a new 
Constitution in 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the parliament in a dramatic series of events resulting 
in the siege of the White House in October of that year. Popular support for Yeltsin’s new 
Constitution led to its approval in December, granting extensive powers to the executive 
branch and tipping the balance of power in the national government away from the 
parliament and toward the President (Willerton, 1997). This shift of power marked a major 
step toward the supremacy of the Russian Presidency and, by association, a first step 
toward the strengthening of the Russian state as a whole. 
The Post-Communist Russian State 
 Now that the setting has been set in which actors were competing for authority in 
Russia after 1993, the actors themselves will be identified. First it will be made clear who 
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was not competing. Yeltsin took the vital first step to state transformation of abolishing the 
old Soviet sources of power, particularly the Communist Party, so the previous formal power 
structures were not competing. The 1993 Constitution, as well as the President’s show of 
strength in overpowering the parliament to see it passed, strengthened the former in relation 
to the latter and, although the parliament was not powerless after 1993, its ability to block 
the President’s policies was weakened. Additionally, as Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 
argue, the division between Soviet state and Soviet society was blurred compared to the 
division of state and society in Eastern European communist states. This means that there 
was little room for civil society to form its own organizations independent of the state. When 
the state collapsed, then, representatives of civil society were not in a position to compete 
for authority (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, 2002). 
 However, other groups were in a position to assert their authority. Yeltsin and his 
reforming government were clearly competitors for a voice in policy-making. Additionally, 
although the former communist institutions did not survive, individual elites often took 
advantage of their power resources to translate their old Soviet power into new Russian 
power. Additionally, many opportunistic individuals took advantage of privatization and 
become the oligarchs, who also wielded great sources of economic power in their 
competition for authority. International groups such as World Bank and various Western 
governments, although generally benevolent, also competed in attempting to shape the new 
Russian state. The state of Russian politics during the 1990s, then, was not a result of the 
successes or failures of Yeltsin and his supporters, but of the combined exertions of every 
actor or group of actors that had a say in the policy making process. 
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Other Considerations 
Federico Varese suggests that the lack of property rights in Russia is also a major 
source of problems for the economy. In a simplified world, he argues, “an individual has a 
‘natural control’ over an asset and aspires to consume or exchange it, and keep the income 
flow (profit) it generates” (Varese, 2001: 23). An individual’s ability to enjoy the benefits of 
his property is directly related to the security of that property, which in turn is a product of the 
ability or desire by others to relieve him of that property. The essence of protection, then, is 
to ensure that an individual is not deprived of his property.  This role has traditionally gone to 
the state, and the ideal protective state is one that protects an individual’s property not just 
against seizure by others but also by the state itself. In order for property rights to be 
effective, the state must not only protect against seizure, but also provide regulations that 
ensure that the owner can make use of his property and implement a criminal penalty that 
will deter attempts at theft (Varese, 2001: 23). 
The Soviet state, as should not come as a surprise for a socialist state, did not have 
a strong tradition of individual property rights. In the new Russian state, individual property 
rights remained a weak area. Varese argues that this weakness was the result of two 
causes. The first of these was that the vast majority of legal actors – lawyers, judges, and 
state officials – had been trained in a system that did not reward independent thinking and 
did not recognize individual property. Although the official policy toward private property 
changed after 1991, the attitude of the legal branch of government largely did not. The 
second reason was that during the formation of the new Russian state, little emphasis was 
put on property rights because there was not a strong lobby for individual property rights, 
and there was not a strong lobby for mass individual property rights simply because there 
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was not a mass of property owners.2
Although it seems that the powerful were able to protect themselves in the early 
1990s through the manipulation of state policy or of those enforcing it, the state was either 
unable or unwilling to provide property protection to society as a whole. It was this disparity 
that fueled the market for security organizations that were capable of protecting, for a fee, 
not just the physical property and body of a client but his property rights and security in 
doing business. 
 This shortcoming was a product of a socialist system 
that frowned upon the concept of individual property ownership. The property rights that 
were provided strongly favored those who were in a position to argue for them – primarily, 
those who already owned or at least controlled large amounts of property. Statistics of firm 
ownership tend to reflect this legal bias. Varese notes that, in 1994, it was a common trend 
for the manager of a privatized firm to maintain ownership and control of the firm between 
himself and a small group of trusted shareholders and to direct the firm with little regard to 
the desires of minor shareholders (Varese, 2001: 28-33). 
Privatized Security 
The privatization of security in Russia resembled the privatization of other aspects of 
the former state-controlled society in that what was once the monopoly of the state was now 
open to the private sector. Although security during the Soviet era was not an economic 
asset, its de-monopolization produced profit-seeking firms that are similar to any other 
service-oriented firm.  
However, the privatization of security differed from other privatization efforts in a 
number of ways. The first of these was that security, unlike other industries, was privatized 
into a market in which market forces were already strong. With varying degrees of legality, 
                                                            
2 Stefan Hedlund suggests that the concept of property rights itself was “seriously underdeveloped” in Russian 
society, having little precedence in either the Soviet Union or pre-socialist Russia (Hedlund, 2001: 216). 
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other actors had been competing in the security market since before the fall of Communism. 
Second, security was not privatized for ideological reasons, but rather as a side effect of 
political reforms. The original law allowing for the creation of private security companies was 
designed to mitigate unemployment caused by the downsizing of state security structures 
for reasons related to the Soviet collapse rather than the de-monopolization of security. 
Third, security is a sector of society in which the government has a vested interest, and 
either does not need to or simply should not allow competition due to the risks to overall 
state security. Finally, security was not privatized in its entirety - the state did not abandon 
its stake in the security market. Instead, it continued, and continues, to compete with both 
legitimate and illegitimate organizations in the provision of security. 
The Pre-existing Post-Soviet Security Market 
 During privatization, most industries were introduced into markets in which 
competition was new and market forces were not very strong. However, private security 
predated the de-monopolization of state security. In the final years of the Soviet Union, 
enterprising groups of people illegally offered their protection services to those who needed 
it. 
 Although the Russian state’s monopoly on protection was officially broken in 1991, it 
had been undermined for several years before that by organized criminal groups. During the 
economic liberalization of the late 1980s, the Soviet state allowed individuals, known as 
kooperators, to open privately-run businesses, which often took the form of small retailers or 
cafes. As devotedly as the state protected its own property, it did not extend that protection 
to private enterprises. State police viewed such entrepreneurs as anti-communist and 
generally refused to protect them against criminal elements (Volkov, 1999). 
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Extortion existed in the Soviet Union just as it did in any society. A popular extortion 
habit was for criminals to attempt to identify individuals with a large hidden wealth and then 
to threaten to turn them in to the state unless they surrendered a portion of their illegal 
holdings (Volkov, 2002). The emergence of kooperators – specifically, the emergence of a 
number of profitable businesses that did not receive government protection – created an 
irresistible opportunity for extortion for such criminal groups. Additionally, a new type of 
criminal group appeared around the same time. Many students, particularly athletes, in the 
late Soviet period found themselves with fewer opportunities and, in the case of athletes, 
less funding for sports activities. Some groups of student athletes, taking advantage of their 
physical abilities and their pre-existing group cohesion and hierarchy, turned their attention 
to the emerging kooperators, and themselves became criminal gangs. These gangs often 
named themselves after whatever shared trait allowed the first members to bond. For 
example, the infamous Tambovskaya crime syndicate of Saint Petersburg was started by a 
group of students from the town of Tambov who were studying in Leningrad at the time. 
Rather than engage in theft, black market dealings, or outright extortion, as their criminal 
predecessors did, these new groups – referred to as bandits rather than thieves – engaged 
the defenseless private businesses in protection rackets (Volkov, 1999). 
Vadim Volkov in his book Violent Entrepreneurs distinguishes between extortion and 
protection rackets, saying that “extortion does not occur on a regular basis or within the 
context of a broader organization in whose name the money is collected, and it does not 
offer regular or imaginary services in return” (Volkov, 2002: 33). These distinctions between 
extortion and protection are important for further discussion of private security in general. A 
further distinction is in the source of the threat from which the victim is being protected. The 
case of criminal groups uncovering and threatening to expose holders of secret wealth is 
clearly a case of extortion, as the threat did not imminently exist until it was levied by the 
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criminal group. The case also satisfies Volkov’s definition of extortion. This level of extortion, 
however, is strictly an illegal activity, and is a large enough departure from the definition of a 
protection racket to be outside the bounds of this discussion.  
A clear-cut case of protection, on the other hand, would be an instance of one 
protection organization offering to provide for the security of a small business that had 
experienced trouble from local criminal gangs. The threat that the victim is being protected 
from is being levied by a third party, the action is recurring, and a genuine service is being 
provided. Because of this the protection organization’s arrangement, while not necessarily 
legal, is a protection racket that benefits both parties. For an organized comparison of 
extortion, racketeering, and protection activities, see Table 1.1. 
 However, the nature of the vast majority of protection deals in the late years of the 
Soviet Union and the early years of the Russian state were not so clearly beneficial. 
Protection organizations generally cooperated to share marketplaces and did not fight 
between themselves for territory or threaten businesses protected by rival organizations. 
However, every unprotected private business was fair game, and business owners generally 
had to accept the first protection offer with which were presented or else face 
consequences. Protection gangs would patrol marketplaces, both reinforcing the sense of 
security of their own clients and providing a visible reminder of the threat facing other 
organizations’ clients. In this way, a number of protection organizations cooperated to 
exercise a form of extortion without actually threatening their own clients (Volkov, 2002). 
The market, willing or unwilling, for protection organizations exploded following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the growth of the private sector, and the retreat of state 
protection. This need for protection, as well as the role of criminal protection organizations in 
fulfilling it, will be discussed in detail in later sections. It suffices to say here that by the time 
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that legal private security companies appeared in Russia, the saying that “every 
businessman has to have a roof” was already a truism (Volkov, 2000: 495). 
 
 
Table 1.1 – Extortion, Racketeering, and Protection 
Classification Extortion Racketeering Benevolent 
Racketeering 
Genuine 
Protection 
Source of 
Threat 
Protection 
Group 
Protection 
Group 
Protection 
Group; External 
External 
Type of 
Protection 
Group 
Disorganized Organized Organized Organized 
Regularity One-Time Repeated Repeated Repeated 
Cost to Client High High Any Low 
Examples Soviet-Era 
Extortion 
Instances, see 
page 10. 
Marketplace 
Bandits, see 
page 10. 
Mafia Protection 
of an Illegal 
Brothel, see 
page 16; 
Modern State, 
see page 16-17. 
Post-1995 
Private 
Protection 
Enterprise, see 
chapter 2 
 
Privatization of State Security 
The privatization of security did not form part of the greater privatization efforts of the 
Russian state. Rather, it came about as a side effect of political, rather than economic, 
reforms. The strength of the Soviet Union, both domestically and abroad, rested largely on 
four institutions. These were the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior (which will 
from here out referred to by its Russian acronym MVD, for Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del), 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the infamous Committee for State Security (or KGB, for 
Komitet Gosudarstvennikh Bezopasnosti). These four organizations, collectively referred to 
as the silovye ministerstva, or “force ministries,” differed from their Western counterparts in 
that they were largely exempt from answering to civil society, strengthening their status as 
sources of power within themselves rather than tools of the government. No Soviet leader 
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could hope to control the state without first courting the force ministries, a lesson which 
Gorbachev learned during the attempted coup of August 1991 (Volkov, 2002). 
The role of the force ministries as a pillar of Soviet strength, however, marked them 
as a clear target for Yeltsin’s political reforms following the fall of the Soviet Union. He 
divided the departments of the former Soviet KGB into a number of smaller organizations 
with the explicit purpose of decentralizing and weakening it. By 1993, what was once the 
KGB had been split into five distinct services, four of which were permitted to retain armed 
units and to carry out law enforcement work. This right was also extended to the MVD 
(which survived the Soviet collapse), the Tax Police, and the Federal Customs Service, 
bringing the number of groups with the right to armed enforcement from three, as in the 
Soviet era, to seven. Many of these agencies had overlapping duties. For example, between 
the MVD and the FSB3
The liberalization of politics as a whole and the fragmentation of the security 
structures greatly decreased the prestige of state security professions. At the same time, the 
ailing state budget and rapid inflation reduced wages for these professions. Largely for 
these reasons, related to the end of the Soviet Union, over 20,000 KGB officers left state 
service either voluntarily or due to job cuts between September 1991 and June 1992. 
Additionally, between 1991 and 1996, roughly 200,000 employees left the MVD every year. 
The MVD, which was facing organizational problems even before the fall of the Soviet 
Union, lost 37,000 commissioned officers in 1989 alone. Tens of thousands of men and 
, four separate directorates were tasked with fighting the same type 
of criminal activity. This forced competition between organizations weakened the force 
structures as a whole, as organizations often refused to share intelligence, failed to 
cooperate, and even undermined each other (Volkov, 2002). 
                                                            
3 The FSB, or Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, is the Russian successor to the Soviet KGB in domestic 
security matters. 
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women, many of whom had no marketable skills other than the application of force, were 
unemployed in the early years of the new Russian state (Volkov 2002: 131).  
Groups of these former security operatives began to offer commercial protection 
services, much like organized criminal groups had already been doing. Concern existed in 
the government, particularly in the MVD, that these commercial protection services would 
become criminal groups themselves, and this concern was well-founded – a 1993 MVD 
report claimed that of the 12,600 policemen who had left the force during the previous year, 
twenty per cent had joined the ranks of organized crime (Varese, 2001: 68). In order to 
combat this turnover, the federal law “On Private Detective and Protection Activity” was 
enacted on March 11, 1992. Intended as a long-term solution about how to absorb the large 
number of newly unemployed state security officers into society, the law allowed civilians to 
form protection businesses with enforcement capabilities legally unavailable to other 
organizations. These capabilities included not just physical protection of clients and property 
but also security consulting, gathering of intelligence on lawsuits, providing information on 
potential business partners or employees, counteracting commercial espionage, searching 
for missing persons, and performing market research for client companies (Volkov, 2000).  
Such security companies fall under the jurisdiction of the MVD. Licenses for firm 
formation are issued by the MVD Department for Licenses and Permissions, and 
supervision of private security companies in general falls to the chief MVD directorate in 
Moscow. In order for the MVD to grant a license to form such a company, several 
requirements have to be met. A higher education degree is required for the head of the 
company as well as at least three years of experience in state security or law enforcement. 
This requirement was put in place primarily to facilitate the licensing of former state security 
operatives over other potential entrepreneurs. However, it also guarantees that at least the 
head of every private security company will likely have personal ties to state security 
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organizations. Additionally, although the head of the agency is required to have state 
experience, many former members of the state law enforcement and security are drawn to 
such agencies as employees. Of the 156,169 licensed security employees in Russia in 
1998, 22.6 percent had previous experience with the MVD, 7.9 percent had experience with 
the KGB or FSB, and 0.8 percent had come from other security organizations. While the 
majority of private security personnel did not have state security experience, the 31.3 
percent that did have that experience occupied the top positions in their respective 
companies (Volkov, 2000, 486-487). 
Three types of private security agencies were allowed in the federal law. The first, 
private detective agencies, are relatively few in number, their services are expensive, and 
they have a very specific purpose. For these reasons, they will largely be ignored for the 
purposes of this analysis. The second type, private protection enterprises, or PPEs, are 
independent organizations that offer protection services on a competitive market. Some of 
these organizations were founded by cohesive groups of former state security specialists. 
For example, the family of protection companies that consist of Alpha-A, Alpha-B, Alpha-7, 
and Alpha-Tverd’ was founded by I. Orekhov and M. Golovatov, former commanders of the 
KGB antiterrorist unit Alpha. As another example, the private protection company Aleks-
Zapad was founded by former officers of a Soviet Army paratroop unit. The third type of 
private security company, called private security services, resemble private protection 
companies in services offered, but are established and run by private businesses and are 
only permitted to supply their services to their parent company. These services were most 
often established by banks or companies producing strategic resources – as of the year 
2000, Gazprom’s security service rivaled the size of an army division with 13,000 personnel 
protecting 41 installations. The same employee composition trends that exist for private 
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protection enterprises also exist for private security services. For example, another Alpha 
commander, V. Zaitsev, became the head of security for Stolichnyi bank (Volkov, 2000). 
With the creation of legal private security companies, then, the security apparatus of 
the former Soviet state was privatized. Private entrepreneurs were permitted to offer, in a 
competitive marketplace, many of the same security services that had formerly been 
monopolized by the state. The fragmentation of the state security structures and the 
weakening of their ability to offer these services was an important step in the political 
transition of the Russian state. However, the creation of private, competing commercial 
security companies was not a purposeful part of the economic privatization effort but rather 
a side effect of this political transition. 
Security and State-Building 
Security is often considered to be a sector of society in which the government has a 
vested interest and either does not need to or simply should not allow competition. The roots 
of this argument lie in state-building theory. Charles Tilly in 1985 promoted the idea, in his 
aptly-named article “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” that a government 
is essentially a large-scale racketeer. The line between legitimate protection and extortion or 
racketeering, he argues, is a matter of degree. A racketeer provides both protection and the 
threat that necessitates that protection, while a genuine protector has no control over the 
threat. However, it may be difficult to determine exactly from what source the danger is 
coming. Racketeers operating in Russian marketplaces in the early 1990s did not threaten 
their own clients, but they cooperated with other racketeers that did pose threats. In another 
of Tilly’s examples, a racketeering criminal group that forces its protection services onto an 
illegally-operating brothel may genuinely protect that business from police interference (Tilly, 
1985: 171). 
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Tilly argues that the contract between the state and its citizens is a protection racket. 
Essentially, he says, the process of building a state consists of four steps. The first step is 
war making, in which the government neutralizes external threats to its authority, such as 
foreign powers. The second step is state making, in which the government neutralizes 
internal threats, such as dissidents, separatists, bandits, or competing claimants for control 
of the state. The third step is protection, in which the government neutralizes the enemies of 
its clients (generally speaking, its citizens). Finally, the government engages in extraction, 
which is the process of acquiring the resources to repeat the first three steps indefinitely. 
The first two steps are carried out for the benefit of the government. While the state’s 
citizens may benefit from successful war making and state making, it is primarily for the 
survival of the government that they are carried out. The third and fourth steps, on the other 
hand, form the government’s protection contract with its citizens (Tilly, 1985: 181). 
The fairness of the protection contract is a matter of degree. If the services that the 
government offers its citizens in fulfillment of step three are minimal but the price extracted 
in step four is high, then the government is a burden on its citizens and has more in 
common with a criminal group. If the government pursues its citizens’ interests both 
domestically and abroad and asks only a small contribution in return, however, the 
government is likely to be seen as a benevolent force. Even in the best of times, though, 
participation in the protection contract is generally not optional for citizens, and failure to 
contribute to the state’s extraction attempts are usually met with punishment of some sort, 
often some form of violence. Monopolization of violence is an important source of legitimacy 
for a government.  As part of the protection pact it makes with its citizens, the government 
must be the only organization permitted to enact violence on them. Competing protectors 
not only raise the cost of protection but threaten the government’s fulfillment of state-making 
(Tilly, 1985: 175). As a result, protection itself is often monopolized by the state. For a state 
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to cede this protection monopoly is to cede some of its power to internal, or possibly 
external, forces. That is not to say that de-monopolization of security does not happen, 
however. Private protection is neither a uniquely Russian nor a uniquely modern 
phenomenon. However, when protection is de-monopolized, it sends a message that the 
state is either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens. 
In a modern state such as the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, the protection 
services offered by the government are not carried out by one single institution. For 
example, the task of neutralizing foreign threats falls to a number of organizations, including 
but not limited to the armed forces, intelligence services, and the diplomatic corps. 
Additionally, for a state to protect its citizens means more than shielding them from physical 
violence, although this is an important task. The government should also protect its citizens’ 
property. In Varese’s definition of property rights, citizens must be allowed to use and 
benefit from their property without the fear of that property being unfairly reallocated by 
another party (Varese, 2001: 18). The task of ensuring that that a citizen is not unfairly 
deprived of his property falls to the law enforcement and judicial bodies of the Russian state. 
In order to determine the extent to which the state is fulfilling its protection contract, it 
will first be decided which bodies are tasked with protecting the citizens, and then whether 
or not they are succeeding. For reasons to be fully explained later, this discussion mostly 
concerns businesses as protection clients. Two bodies within the Russian government were, 
in the 1990s, tasked with the protection of businesses. The MVD is responsible for law 
enforcement, and arbitrazh courts, which have their roots in the former Soviet state arbitrazh 
courts, ensure that property rights are protected. If crime rates, particularly violent ones, 
were low in the 1990s, then it is possible that the MVD was doing its job well, and if arbitrazh 
courts are also determined to have been effective ways of resolving disputes, then the 
citizens can be assumed to be well-protected. However, the efficiency of these bodies is not 
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the only concern. The prevalence of unreported crimes can reduce the usefulness of crime 
rates as an indicator of police effectiveness. Therefore, the public opinion concerning law 
enforcement and judicial bodies will also be taken into account. Even if law enforcement and 
judicial bodies are operating effectively, clients will still seek protection from a non-state 
provider if some other factor causes them to believe that their safety is at risk.   
In the first few years of the Russian state, the state security structures tasked by the 
state with stopping domestic crime, including the MVD, were fragmented and reorganized, 
greatly reducing their effectiveness, particularly in combating organized crime. The MVD 
itself saw high rates of employee turnover in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The lost 
personnel were quickly replaced, but this turnover meant that many of the agents charged 
with law enforcement were relatively inexperienced (Volkov, 2002). The ultimate official 
report card for the MVD’s law enforcement capability, however, is in crime rates, as reflected 
in Table 1.2. Official MVD-reported crime rates increased by 194.5 percent between 1985 
and 1995, with the sharpest increase in 1989 and a leveling out in 1993. However, this 
statistic only reflects reported crimes, and according to one study, somewhere between 40 
percent and 70 percent of crimes went unreported from 1991 to 1993. Similarly, homicide 
rates jumped from 15.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991 to 30.4 per 100,000 in 1993. 
Corruption at all levels of society was also rampant during this time. In a 1996 international 
study, Russia ranked 47th out of the 54 countries surveyed, revealing a high level of 
corruption, and its position only worsened in the next two years (Varede, 2001: 19-20). The 
clear implication of these statistics is that law enforcement was not protecting society from 
crime as effectively as it had done in the Soviet period. 
While the MVD protected the state’s citizens, as well as the state itself, against 
crime, arbitrazh courts specialized in protecting business transactions. Business law and 
etiquette did not grow in step with business itself in the new free market economy. Business 
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was often seen as dishonest, and for good reason. In the stock exchanges of the early 
1990s, it became commonplace for brokers to list a product on several different exchanges 
and honor only the most valuable contract. One survey showed that 30 percent of contracts 
made in Russian exchanges were not honored (Frye, 2002a).  
 
Table 1.2 – Crime Increase in the Russian Federation 
Year Total Reported Crimes 
(In Thousands) 
Homicide Rate (per 
100,000 
population) 
1985 1,417  
1986 1,338  
1987 1,186  
1988 1,220 9.8 
1989 1,619 12.6 
1990 1,839 14.3 
1991 2,173 15.3 
1992 2,761 22.9 
1993 2,800 30.4 
1994 2,633 30.6 
1995 2,756 26.5 
(Varese, 2001: 19, 20) 
To provide for the new types of property that had appeared in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Russian state instituted arbitrazh, or business arbitration, courts. These courts were not 
a new creation, but rather a modification of the old Soviet state arbitration courts. A change 
of character in the old court was necessary to deal with private property. Soviet state 
arbitration had resolved disputes between two or more state-owned enterprises. A decision 
by the court would only mean transferring resources from one state fund to another, and 
rulings tended to favor the decision that would benefit the overall economy more than the 
group that had actually been in the right. New court procedures resulted in a fairer process, 
but one that was more difficult for citizens to use. The most debilitating problem was the 
inability of the courts to enforce their decisions. Awards to a claimant could only be taken 
from a defendant that had money to give, and hiding funds in secret accounts or even 
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abroad became common practice. In an interview in July 1996, a court enforcer in Saratov 
admitted that only five of the 25 rulings waiting for enforcement stood a chance of being 
collected. This lack of enforcement, in addition to newer and higher court fees, meant that 
many businessmen would not risk taking their complaints to court (Hendley, 1998). 
 In response to this business atmosphere, private protection organizations began 
offering additional services beyond physical protection. Among these, debt recovery, 
contract enforcement, and dispute settlement became very important to businessmen, who 
often felt as if they could not rely on the state to perform these services. In 1993 and 1994, 
roughly 70 percent of contracts were enforced through private means rather than through 
state enforcement bodies (Volkov, 2000: 491). 
The clear implication of these shortcomings is that the state institutions tasked with 
fulfilling the state’s end of the protection contract with its citizens were failing to do so. This 
failure was a direct result of the fragmentation of the state security structures and the poor 
implementation of property laws, both of which were in turn results of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s reforms, and Yeltsin’s inability to consolidate authority over policy-
making in the central government. Whether or not it was an intention of Yeltsin or his 
reformers to reduce the state’s capacity to fulfill its protection contract, however, is unclear. 
The Players in the Security Market 
 After the creation of the 1992 law “On Private Detective and Protection Activity”, 
security was not privatized in its entirety. The state did not abandon its stake in the security 
market, but rather continued to offer its services to the same clients for whom legal and 
illegal private security groups competed. In order to accurately analyze this competition, 
distinctions must first be made in the nature of services offered, to whom these services 
were being offered, the types of organizations in competition, and time period. 
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Services Offered 
 All security providers offer a number of common services to their clients.  Some 
services exist, however, that are unique to their particular type of protection organization. 
For example, only the state has the manpower, material capacity, and diplomatic clout to 
offer protection against foreign threats. Illegal protection organizations can also offer many 
additional services to their clients. Some businessmen report being provided with physical 
renovation labor and money loans by strangers with evident ties to organized crime. The 
acceptance of such offers would assuredly be taken as evidence by the criminal groups in 
question that they could force the protection arrangement on their client permanently. Other 
clearly criminal acts such as assassinations and physical intimidation are tools used by such 
organizations to aid their clients’ businesses. In one incident, for example, a Krasnoyarsk 
businessman ordered the murder of his business partner by a hired mafia assassin upon 
realizing that killing his partner would actually be cheaper than buying him out.  In Vorkuta, a 
criminal group intervened to stop a workers’ strike by threatening the strike leader at 
gunpoint. These services are in addition to the multitude of illegal activities in which Russian 
criminal groups may participate that do not fall under the loose definition of protection 
(Varese 2001). Legal private security companies also offer services not provided by either 
the state or illegal security organizations. For example, a 1999 article from the Russian 
business journal Profil notes that the PPEs Bayard, MIG, and Fond “Pravoporyadok-Tsentr” 
have capitalized on their brand recognition by selling automated security systems and 
establishing training schools for security guards (Inna Lukyanova and Olga Kazanskaya, 
1999).  
However, services such as assassinations or security training schools are mostly 
beyond the scope of this comparison of service offerings. The services important for the 
sake of my analysis are those that would otherwise be provided by state law enforcement in 
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the broad sphere of personal and property protection, specifically in the prevention, 
discouragement, and correction of unfair or unlawful action against a person or his or her 
property. The sphere of personal protection includes bodyguard services and the stationing 
of security guards. The sphere of property protection, however, is a much wider category, 
encompassing essentially any action that protects the integrity and usefulness client’s 
personal and business property. Services offered under the category of property protection 
include debt recovery, building or real property protection, cargo escort and protection, 
investigation of potential business connections, internal theft prevention, and so on. Not 
every organization offers every form of protection, and some even specialize in one form in 
particular. For example, the PPE Alternativa-M specializes in international financial 
investigations, particularly in debt recovery when the sum in question is being stored abroad 
(Lukyanova and Kazanskaya, 1999). However, these services are common to state, illegal 
private, and legal private protection organizations in general that compete to offer them to 
potential clients. Table 1.3 outlines a list of services typically provided by security 
organizations. 
Table 1.3 – Services Offered by ISOs (Illegal Security Organizations), PPEs (Private Protection 
Enterprises), and the state 
Type of Service ISO Method PPE Method State Method 
Physical Protection Intimidation of 
potential threats 
Bodyguards, 
response teams 
General area 
security, response 
teams (police)  
Property Protection Intimidation of 
potential threats 
Security guards, 
response teams 
General area 
security,  response 
teams (police) 
Debt Recovery Debtor 
intimidation 
Debtor 
investigation 
Arbitrazh courts 
(judicial) 
Business Partnership 
Insurance (Contract 
Enforcement, internal theft 
prevention, etc) 
Investigation of 
potential 
partners, 
intimidation 
Investigation, 
business research, 
surveillance 
Arbitrazh courts, 
criminal courts 
(judicial)  
Unique Services Assassination, 
money loans 
Security training 
schools, security 
product sales 
Protection from 
international threats 
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To Whom Services Are Offered 
Who are the clients for protection services? For the purpose of this comparison, a 
client is a small, non-industrial, commercial enterprise. Private citizens are not relevant to 
the discussion because they take advantage of only a small number of protection services – 
primarily, physical protection services such as bodyguards. Large enterprises are also not 
relevant. The inadequate property rights that existed in Russia at the time of this comparison 
tended to more thoroughly protect the interests of such enterprises. Additionally, larger 
enterprises tend to be capable of maintaining their own sizeable and effective private 
security services which are also not central to this comparison, as will be explained shortly. 
Finally, manufacturing firms also do not need the full range of protection services offered by 
security organizations. Although the need for physical security for the purpose of facility 
protection still exists, Timothy Frye points out that only 3 percent of these firms had hired a 
non-state protection organization for the purpose of debt collection (Frye 2002b: 576).  
However, Hendley and her colleagues have a potential explanation for the tendency 
of manufacturing firms to not use private security services. Although manufacturing firms are 
no more trusting of the arbitration abilities of Russian courts than are businessmen, it seems 
that manufacturing firms do not heavily rely on the courts in the first place. Deals made by 
manufacturing firms are often made between personal contacts, many of which were formed 
during the Soviet era. As a result, business deals made by manufacturing firms are much 
more reliable than those between other businessmen, who might have no personal 
familiarity with their potential partners. Manufacturing firms also rely on prepayments from 
their purchasers, thus negating the possibility of a contract falling through. Finally, complex 
transactions do not seem to take place often between manufacturing firms, reducing the 
need for third-party arbitration bodies to step in and ensure that the contract is being 
handled fairly (Hendley, et al., 1997). The implication behind these factors is that, since 
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third-party arbitration is simply not necessary for manufacturing firms to do business, they 
have no reason to choose a type of protection service that offers debt recovery or contract 
enforcement over one that does not. 
Who Offers Services? 
There are three basic types of organizations that are involved in competition for the 
security market: illegal security organizations, private protection organizations, and the 
state. Illegal protection organizations are, by definition, not defined by law. They often offer 
services similar to those offered by legal protection organizations, but they engaged in illegal 
activities to the extent that they must hide the majority of their organization from law 
enforcement. Protection services are just one of the many profitable enterprises into which 
an organized criminal group can enter. Any organized criminal group that participates in 
illegal racketeering or offers any security services in general can be referred to as an illegal 
security organization, or ISO. Understandably, the line between illegal and legal private 
security is a vague one. There have been attempts by some criminal groups to become 
licensed as PPEs by the MVD or to create sub-groups that are so licensed in order to 
legalize the group’s protection actions, such as the carrying of firearms, and legitimize the 
group’s protection racket and thus attract employees from the state law enforcement. Two 
such example of criminal organizations that obtained security licenses are the PPE 
“Scorpion,” headed by A. Efimov of the Tambovskaya gang, and the PPE “Adris,” operated 
by the Malyshevskaya gang, and which protected companies including Baskin-Robbins in 
Russia (Volkov, 2000). 
It is the second sector of the security market – legal private security, or private 
protection enterprises (PPEs) – with which this paper is primarily concerned. However, the 
1992 law that allowed for the creation of PPEs also allowed for the creation two other types 
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of legal private security companies. The second type of company, private detective 
agencies, is not important to this discussion. They are relatively few in number; their 
services are expensive; and they offer services that are outside the scope of security and 
protection. The third type of private security company is a private security service, or PSS, 
which is established and owned by a parent company. A PSS does not operate freely on the 
security market, as do ISOs and PPEs. Instead, it is only legally permitted to provide its 
services to its parent company, from which it in turn receives funding. 
Table 1.4 – Private Security Firm Numbers in the 1990s 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total # of Private 
Security Firms 
0 4,540 6,605 7,987 9,863 10,487 10,804 11,652 
# of Operating 
PPEs 
0 1,237 1,586 3,247 4,434 5,280 5,995 6,775 
# of Operating 
PSSs 
0 2,356 2,931 4,591 5,247 5,005 4,580 4,612 
Firms Shut Down 
by MVD 
0 0 73 690 622 978 1,364 1,277 
% of Industry 
Shut Down by 
MVD 
0 0 1.1% 8.6% 6.3% 9.3% 13.6% 10.9% 
(Volkov, 2002: 138) 
Immediately following the enactment of the 1992 law, PSSs were not only the most 
common type of legal private security company but also the largest. By 1994, 21,805 people 
were employed in PSSs, as opposed to 16,500 employed in PSEs (Giblov et al., 1995). As 
shown in Table 1.4, 2,356 Private Security Services existed in 1993, as compared to only 
1,237 PPEs. The number of PSSs reached its highest number in 1996 with 5,247 firms in 
existence. However, PPEs had closed the gap, and in the same year 4,434 PPEs were in 
operation. In the following years, the number of PSSs actually decreases while the number 
of PPEs continued to rise at a steady pace, and this trend continued through the end of the 
1990s.  
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There are several explanations for the trend. First, PSSs are less efficient than 
PPEs, which are generally larger and benefit from an economy of scale. Additionally, 
whereas PSSs have a guaranteed client in their parent company, PPEs are forced to 
compete openly on the market, and thus tend to offer better services for lower prices 
(Volkov, 2000). Furthermore, the fates of PSSs are tied to that of their parent companies. 
For example, during the economic burst of 1995, 125 banks went bankrupt, taking their 
security services down with them. The instability of PSSs worried the MVD, which had to 
hurry to disarm the now-unemployed former private security personnel who had worked for 
these services (Pogonchenkov, 1997). The MVD had already been suspicious of the 
potentially subversive capacity of PSSs, since such organizations were more strongly 
responsible to the interests of their parent companies than to that of the state or any other 
body. As a result, when MVD scrutiny over and regulation of all forms of legal private 
security intensified in 1995, PSSs were particularly popular targets (Volkov, 2000). 
As the hassles of maintaining a private security service increased, a new trend 
appeared. Rather than create a PSS of its own, businesses often preferred to form freely 
operating PPEs. These companies are free to offer their services to other organizations, 
thus covering the costs of their own operation and even becoming profitable. The parent 
business maintains a majority share control over the PPE, ensuring priority to the parent 
business over its other clients, but the PPE otherwise functions as any other; although, there 
is concern by other clients about the PPE’s capacity for industrial espionage in favor of its 
parent business (Pogonchenkov, 1997). The trend to establish an independent but majority-
controlled PPE rather than create a PPS also very likely contributed to the decline in PSS 
numbers. Because of their decline in relevance, and because PSSs do not compete freely in 
the security market but rather offer their services to one single guaranteed client, they do not 
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play a large role in the competition for the security market and are not important to this 
comparison. 
The third and final section of the security market is the state. The state’s role in 
security provision has already been discussed, and it retains a large share of the security 
market by offering the services of its law enforcement and judicial institutions. However, the 
state does not act like a market actor, so an explanation for why the state is being treated as 
a competitor in the security market is in order. As Charles Tilly stated, “governments are in 
the business of selling protection, whether the people want it or not” (Tilly, 1985: 175). In 
theory, a client cannot opt out of the state’s protection contract. The state’s biggest strength 
is that entering into its protection contract is required by law. Most of the analysis here will 
be devoted to explaining why clients choose another type of protection, if any, in addition to 
the state. In practice, however, it is completely possible for a client to at least partially opt 
out of its contract with the state, as evidenced by the fact that the Russian government 
collected only 60 percent of its projected tax revenue in 1994(Newcity, 1997: 42). A 
businessman who avoids paying his taxes will still receive many of the benefits of state 
protection. However, it is in his best interest to avoid any type of state protection – such as 
taking a lawsuit to court – that will invite state scrutiny into his dealings, as scrutiny is likely 
to uncover evidence of his tax evasion. 
Time Period 
Now that the three competing sections in the security market have been introduced, 
it is important to divide the 1990s into two periods of time. This division is not definitive. 
More attention will be paid shortly to the various political trends in Russia in the 1990s and 
their effects on the operation of private security companies, and the matter is not as clear-
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cut as splitting the 1990s in half. However, the transition point that is relevant for this 
analysis of competition in the security market occurred in 1995.  
The pre-1995 period, with which this chapter is concerned, was one of relative 
chaos, or what Volkov calls a “state of nature” (Volkov, 2002: 127). The fragmentation of the 
security structures and legal reforms concerning private property weakened the state’s 
capacity to offer physical or legal protection to its citizens, as previously argued, at a time 
when a new private sector was emerging that needed new forms of property protection. 
Criminal organizations fulfilled these new protection needs on a large scale and maintained 
a sizeable share of the security market, as well as control of much of the entire business 
market itself. Because the services offered by private protection organizations were already 
firmly planted in the realm of crime, and since profit was the only motivating factor of these 
organizations, the next logical step from securing a business as a client was taking over the 
business completely. MVD statistics from January 1994 claim that 40,000 businesses, 
including 2,000 state-run businesses, were controlled or owned by criminal groups, and that 
55 percent of capital was controlled by these same groups. Other sources dispute these 
statistics, arguing that this number actually exceeds the number of profitable businesses in 
Russia at the time (Volkov, 1999). The general consensus, though, seems to be that the 
vast majority of private businesses in Russia in the early 1990s were protected or controlled 
by criminal groups. 
Although they began to appear in 1992, PPEs did not hold a large share of the 
security market prior to 1995. They were viewed by government security organizations as 
competition and by potential clients as only slightly more trustworthy than ISOs. Government 
authorities expressed fears that legal matters were not being resolved by judicial bodies, but 
in informal and possibly illegal situations by private bodies (Zarubin, 2001). The state of the 
pre-1995 security market, then, was that PPEs were unreliable, the state was either 
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unwilling or unable to provide effective security services, and organized crime controlled a 
large section of the security market through coercion. Because success in the pre-1995 
security market was granted not by effective competition but by exploitation, as is the main 
reason for the predominance of ISOs, market competition prior to 1995 is not worth 
examining. ISOs dominated the market, and PPEs did not yet have the post-1995 
advantages that will be introduced in the next chapter and which allowed them to break 
ISOs’ control of the private security market. 
Conclusion 
 The Soviet collapse, the struggle to create a new Russian state, and the reformation 
of the state security structures caused the early 1990s to be a period of turmoil. Although 
elites were able to take care of themselves, the government was unable satisfactorily protect 
the property, rights, and physical security of its citizens. This situation created demand for 
private organizations that were willing to do so. However, lack of regulation over this market 
meant that those organizations that were willing to rely on illegal measures to promote their 
services enjoyed strong advantages over those organizations that were not. As a result, 
organized crime dominated the private security market and used this position of power to 
assert control over much of the Russian economy. 
 Toward the end of Yeltsin’s first term in office, the government began to get back on 
its feet. A number of events in the early- to mid-1990s signaled this attempted assertion of 
authority by Yeltsin’s government, beginning with the President’s favorable position following 
the Constitutional crisis of 1993. The most important of these events for the purposes of this 
paper occurred in 1995, when the MVD responded to a Presidential decree demanding that 
it tighten regulation methods over the private security industry. These regulations 
fundamentally changed this industry. This change will be the subject of the second chapter. 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
COMPETING TO PROTECT 
Introduction 
 The private security market changed fundamentally in 1995 due to a seemingly 
minor occurrence. In that year, the Presidential administration asked the MVD to strengthen 
its regulatory practices over private security firms. This change increased the public’s trust in 
PPEs and, just as importantly, increased the MVD’s trust in them. Perceived as honest and 
professional organizations and utilizing the resources made available to them by 
cooperating with the MVD, PPEs became strong competitors to ISOs in the post-1995 
security market.  
 As Yeltsin struggled with other actors vying for influence over Russia’s policymaking 
process, the state continued to be unable to satisfactorily protect the property, rights, and 
physical security of most of its citizens. Small businesses had to make the choice of either 
entrusting their security to the state, relying on the protection of a criminal organization, or 
hiring services of a private protection firm. The factors that might lead a business to choose 
one provider over the others, as well as the political events that allowed the private security 
industry to continue to thrive, are the subject of this chapter. 
Yeltsin’s Limitations 
A strong central government, argues Tompson, is one that is internally cohesive, 
relatively autonomous from society, and able to push forward policy without consent from 
outside actors. A strong government, as is probably obvious from these criteria, is not 
necessarily a democratic one. However, it is a potent one and capable of implementing a 
 coherent set of laws and regulations toward whatever ideological or institutional ends it sees 
fit (Tompson, 2001). 
 The Yeltsin government largely failed to satisfy these requirements. In competition 
for authority that existed within the national government, Yeltsin was strong. After the failed 
1991 coup, he saw the opportunity to capitalize on his popularity by consolidating authority 
in his position in order protect his administration while he pushed forward with potentially 
unpopular reform efforts (White, 1997). Throughout its early existence, Yeltsin’s 
administration preferred speed over the creation of a coalition that would provide support 
while undergoing slow reforms over a longer period of time. However, the Russian 
parliament supported a more moderate set of reforms, and tension between the legislature 
and the executive branch grew. William Tompson called Yeltsin’s government under Gaidar 
a “kamikaze cabinet” after its intentions to drive drastic and unpopular reforms at the cost of 
its own survival (Tompson, 2001: 174) After the Constitutional Crisis of 1993, however, 
Yeltsin’s 1993 Constitution created a government in which authority was concentrated in the 
executive branch. It essentially gave the President the right to direct legislation, to form his 
own administration, and to issue legal decrees (White, 1997). 
 After 1993, Yeltsin’s government successfully isolated itself from competition within 
the formal central government structure. However, its great weakness was its inability to 
isolate itself from non-formal or non-central actors. The two major obstacles to Yeltsin’s 
reform attempts were the oligarchs and the regional administrations. The oligarchs rose 
directly from Yeltsin’s privatization efforts. One of his first actions as part of privatization was 
to free prices, meaning that prices on most goods, formerly kept artificially low by the Soviet 
government, changed to their market price almost overnight. A number of well-positioned 
and opportunistic elites, generally either enterprise managers or their close associates, took 
this chance to buy a large number of industrial goods and commodities at their low fixed 
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prices and then resell them for much more after prices were freed (Tompson, 2001). Some 
of the wealthiest and most influential oligarchs, however, were able to take advantage of the 
loans-for-shares program of the mid 1990s to obtain large shares of a natural resource 
production company for relatively low prices (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). Yeltsin accrued 
a political debt to these people after the 1996 Presidential election when, faced with 
dropping popularity, he made a figurative deal with the devil and asked the oligarchs for help 
with his reelection. They used their formidable monetary and media resources to support a 
successful reelection campaign, with the understanding that they would hold much influence 
of Yeltsin during his second term in office (Braguinsky, 2009). Having made their money 
largely through rent seeking, many of the oligarchs used this influence to block any policy 
that limited their ability to continue to rent seek. In order to pass legislation, Yeltsin’s 
administration generally had to make concessions to these oligarchs, meaning that attempts 
at liberalization often resulted in further entrenching their power (Tompson, 2001). 
 Regional governors also thwarted Yeltsin’s attempts at federal supremacy. Although 
the governors of Russia’s 89 regions were nominally subordinate to the Kremlin, Yeltsin 
relied heavily on the political support of regional governors, particularly in the face of 
dwindling popular support, and his government did not generally interfere in their affairs. 
Many governors enjoyed what Hashim calls “personal fiefdoms” in which they governed with 
little regard to the wishes of either Moscow or their own constituents (Hashim, 2005: 29). 
Even in 1999, in the last year of Yeltsin’s term, the Russian Federation Justice Ministry 
reported the existence of over 50,000 regional laws that contradicted national-level laws. 
Although regional governors could not directly influence the passing of policy by the national 
government, Yeltsin’s economic policies had to include appeasements to them (Hashim, 
2005).  
38 
 
Although Yeltsin’s administration had effectively pushed the balance of authority in 
the national government toward the Presidency, there were many influential non-central 
government actors – specifically, regional authorities and the oligarchs – who also had the 
ability to affect policy, and liberalization and the improvement of property and physical 
protection for Russian citizens as a whole was generally not in these actors’ best interests. 
Yeltsin had laid the framework for a strong, centralized government during his first term in 
office, and the Russian state had begun to more strongly assert its control over domestic 
affairs. However, in securing his political position, he had ceded much of his authority to 
other actors, ensuring that the national government’s power would be hobbled through the 
end of the 1990s. 
The Post-1995 Private Security Market 
As Hare and Muravyev note, there are three steps for market growth. First, new firms 
must enter the market. Second, existing enterprises – particularly, as in Russia’s case, firms 
that had operated differently under communist control – must restructure for growth. Finally, 
underperforming firms must be shut down (Hare and Muravyev, 2003: 347). In the pre-1995 
security market, the first step was certainly true, particularly following the adoption of the 
1992 “On Private Detective and Protection Activity” Law. The extent to which restructuring 
took place is questionable. The market failed to force underperforming firms out of business, 
however. A large number of private security services existed, which did not respond to 
market forces. ISOs also controlled a large section of the market. The state law enforcement 
organs were not strong or efficient enough to force ISOs out of operation, and the 
continuation of a protector-client relationship was generally the ISO’s decision rather than 
the client’s. 
In the post-1995 period, however, the Russian security market began to perform 
more like a healthy, competitive marketplace in which the quality of services, rather than 
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overt coercion or lack of options, decided what type of provider a potential client would 
choose.  PSSs, which are not responsive to market forces, declined in popularity during this 
period relative to PPEs, which do respond to market forces.  More importantly, in 1995, a 
ministerial decree was issued demanding that the MVD increase its control over the activity 
of private security organizations. This decree resulted in stricter licensing controls and 
tighter monitoring of existing PPEs, including the creation of electronic accounting and 
identification systems and more diligent attempts to revoke the licenses of private security 
firms that broke MVD regulations. Statistics clearly illustrate the results of this decree. No 
security firms were shut down in 1993, and 73 firms, or roughly 1.1 percent of the firms in 
operation, were closed in 1994. However, in 1995, 690, or roughly 8.6 percent of the firms in 
operation, were closed by the MVD. That number continued to stay high, hitting a high point 
in 1998 when 1,364 closures meant that the MVD had shut down 13.6 percent of all legal 
private security firms (Volkov, 2002: 138). It should not immediately be assumed, however, 
that these closures primarily targeted inefficient or underperforming firms. MVD regulations 
tend to favor large, efficient, well-supervised agencies with experienced employees rather 
than smaller organizations (Zarubin, 2001). It seems, then, that underperforming 
organizations are more likely to be targeted, although profitability is not necessary the 
criterion by which the MVD targets a firm for investigation. Additionally, these new 
regulations made it difficult for criminal organizations fronting as PPEs to continue to 
operate. The PPE Scorpion, which was run by the Tambovskaya criminal group, was shut 
down by the MVD in 1996 and its chairman Efimov was arrested a year later (Volkov, 2000).  
This increase in regulation, combined with the fact that the pool of unemployed 
former state security operatives had largely been exhausted, means that the number of 
PPEs in existence, which had been rapidly increasing since 1992, began to level out in 
1996. As a result, whereas the pre-1995 body of legal private security companies was 
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inundated with small, inexperienced, and legally questionable firms, the post-1995 market 
was highly regulated both by market forces and by MVD authorities, clearing up much of the 
distrust that state organs held toward these firms and thus allowing a mutually beneficial 
alliance between the two groups. PPEs with state ties could coordinate with state law 
enforcement in such ways as sharing case information and providing force where state 
coverage was thin. In return, law enforcement agencies could provide PPEs with 
compensation in the form of money or equipment (Volkov, 2000). Additionally, and just as 
importantly, cooperation with state agencies provides the ultimate in brand recognition for a 
PPE. If a PPE advertises its cooperation with a state agency or agencies in general, it 
assures potential clients that the organization is legitimate, non-criminal, and professional. 
Thus, the incentive of an instant positive market reputation encourages PPEs to follow MVD 
regulations and to work closely with state agencies (Aleksandrov, 2001). Such is the 
cooperation between post-1995 PPEs and the state that A.I. Gurov, the chairman of the 
Security Committee of the Russian Federation State Duma, referred to the former as the 
“reserve, partner, and ally” of the latter (Gurov, 2001: 103). 
An unintentional but beneficial side effect of the alliance between state agencies and 
PPEs, which further increased the role of market forces after 1995, was the breaking of 
criminal control over businesses in Russia. ISOs had essentially cornered the protection 
market in Russia by 1994. However, disrupting this control was an interest shared by both 
the state and legitimate PPEs. To state law enforcement agencies, ISOs were essentially 
organized crime, which by definition they were expected to combat. To a PPE, though, ISOs 
are competition in the protection market. The circumstances and process by which a client 
could rid itself of ISO protection required the legal capacity of the state and the physical 
protection capabilities of a PPE. The general consensus among law enforcement 
representatives seems to be that criminal control of the Russian economy has been greatly 
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weakened since the middle of the 1990s. The head of the PPE Argus lists as a selling point 
for his company that none of his clients fall under the protection of the mafia (Volkov, 2000). 
Government sources, too, cite the cooperation between PPEs and the state as one of the 
primary reasons that “main types of activity and main enterprises [of Russian business] are 
free from the criminal influence in the Russian Federation” (Gudkov, 2001: 124). Although 
the assertion that Russian business is completely free from criminal influence is debatable, 
the general statement that criminal control of the economy has weakened seems to be true. 
Competition for Clients 
 The security capabilities of the Soviet state were privatized following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. However, the new Russian state did not cease to offer similar protection 
services to those offered by ISOs and PPEs. Each sector of the security market had unique 
benefits and risks, and one can predict that a number of factors might determine whether a 
client will choose to enlist illegal or legal private security or to rely solely on the state. 
 For the purpose of this discussion, several assumptions will be made. First, it will be 
assumed that a profitable business that does not hire a private protection provider is under 
the protection of the state. Second, a business will not hire both a PPE and an ISO, nor will 
it hire more than one organization from either group. Third, a client that is content with the 
level of protection provided to him by the state will not hire a private provider. Finally, 
because each client will generally choose one provider to the exclusion of all other 
competing providers (the state not technically being a competitor), ISOs and PPEs will 
compete for clients in some way, making the provision of security a competitive market. The 
specifics of competition are mostly unavailable, especially in the case of ISOs. Prices for 
services vary greatly, and it is difficult to quantify the quality of services offered – as one 
journalist noted, the quality of a protection service is only revealed when it fails 
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(Pogonchenkov, 1997). It will be assumed, however, that all organizations that attempt to 
make a profit from providing security services will compete against each other in some way 
for clients, and they do so by offering a variety of services that fulfill a number of general 
protection needs, as illustrated in Table 1.3 in the previous chapter. 
The State 
The state can be thought of as the discount option. Taking for granted that 
acceptance of the state’s protection and payment for its services is mandatory for all, the 
state is the cheapest option. However, a business enlisting the state’s protection services 
and only the state’s protection services is getting what it pays for: although the state is by far 
the largest and the most capable protection firm, to the individual it can only offer semi-
reliable security and unreliable arbitration. In practice, a business can opt out of the state’s 
protection contract by withholding taxes. However, this is illegal, and has negative 
consequences even if the practice is not discovered.  
Illegal Security Organizations 
The benefits of enlisting the services of an illegal private protection organization over 
relying solely on the state’s protection are obvious. While the state may not be entirely 
capable of protecting a client against physical threats to person and property, a private 
protection organization is more capable of doing so – especially when the physical threat is 
made by the organization in question in order to coerce the client to accept protection. 
Criminal groups, however, can offer to their clients services that can give them an 
advantage in business, such as contract enforcement, debt recovery, or money loans. 
However, there also exist serious risks in hiring an illegal private protection organization. 
Once a client is under a criminal group’s “roof,” he is at its mercy. As the protection contract 
is made informally between the client and the protection organization, the state does not 
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play a role in ensuring that all sides play fair. In fact, simply admitting to the state that such a 
contract exists is to admit to a criminal act. The protection organization can use this leverage 
to extort higher protection fees from its clients and to lessen the extent to which they fulfill 
their protection duties. Additionally, it can be extremely difficult for the client to end the 
protection contract. Finally, competition among private protection organizations actually 
increases rather than decreases the cost to the client. Unencumbered by state regulation, 
ISOs find it more profitable to decrease supply by violently subduing competitors rather than 
by offering improved services, and to increase demand by causing the threats that make 
potential clients seek protection rather than by lowering prices (Frye, 2002a).  
Private Protection Enterprises 
 The loosening of ISO control over the protection market, as well as the changes in 
the legal private security market after 1995, altered the performance of PPEs in the 
protection market enough to make the benefits and risks of pre-1995 PPEs irrelevant. The 
benefits for a client of choosing a post-1995 PPE, however, are many. A PPE that works 
with the state is capable of harnessing the massive judicial capabilities of the state for its 
client. Additionally, a regulated PPE is forced to compete with other PPEs within a legal 
framework. Whereas ISOs compete by manipulating supply and demand through illegal 
means, PPEs must compete in the protection market by offering better services at a lower 
price. The contract between a PPE and its client is also recognized and enforced by the 
state, meaning that a PPE cannot arbitrarily alter its pricing or the services it offers. The 
physical protection offered to the individual client by a contract with a strong PPE is much 
greater than that offered by the state and very competitive with that offered by ISOs, as 
evidenced by the fact that clients of the PPE Argus do not seem to experience trouble from 
organized crime. 
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 However, contracting with a PPE has two major limitations. The first of these is that 
many small businesses just do not have the money to hire a PPE. The second is that PPEs 
simply cannot legally offer some of the services that ISOs can. Debt recovery, one of the 
services so desired by businessmen who operate in an unregulated economy, is one of 
these services. MVD authorities have attempted to stop the practice of debt recovery as part 
of their increased regulation of the PPE market. If a PPE wishes to secure the cooperation 
of state agencies that makes it so attractive to clients, then it must offer restricted debt 
recovery services to its clients (Volkov, 2000). This service usually consists of investigations 
into debtors’ alternate, undisclosed, and often foreign-based accounts and holdings in order 
to present proof that the individual or firm in question is capable of repaying its debts. These 
measures are often enough to force a repayment, and if they are not, then the PPE can 
present its evidence to an arbitrazh court (Lukyanova and Kazanskaya, 1999). Although 
doing so is often effective, one imagines that ISOs have much more effective methods in 
their arsenals to persuade an individual to repay his debts. 
Why would a client choose form of protection over another? 
 When the benefits, risks, and limitations of each type of protection are examined, a 
number of expectations can be formulated. They are as follows: 
1. If respect for state judicial institutions is high and the state-imposed cost of doing 
business is low, the state is chosen as the only protector. 
 On paper, a client cannot opt out of the state’s protection plan. A client can, however, 
decide that he requires additional or more reliable protection services than the ones offered 
by the state. Two factors seem to be required for a client to commit to the state’s protection 
contract and forgo other choices. First, trust in the state’s legal institutions must be high. The 
client must feel that any problems it has can be resolved through the judicial process offered 
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by the state. Second, if the cost of doing business is high, more clients will opt out of state 
protection. This cost includes not just taxes, but overbearing regulations that might decrease 
the efficiency or profitability of a business (Frye, 2002b). 
2. An ISO is often chosen when the client is already engaged in illegal activities. 
 It stands to reason that if a client is engaged in activities that disinvite state scrutiny 
such as tax evasion or illegal trading, it will turn to an ISO for protection. The state cannot be 
relied on because turning to the state for help would invite scrutiny that could reveal the 
client’s illegal activities. Additionally, PPEs in Russia that wish to maintain their alliance with 
state security agencies would likely not cooperate with clients engaged in illegal practices. 
Thus, if the high cost of business or weak judicial institutions invite illegal practices, it can be 
expected that ISOs form an important, if not the primary, form of protection enlisted by 
clients. 
3. A PPE is often chosen when a client has the money, or when a client feels that the PPE is 
well regulated. 
 The current situation in Russia provides a prime example of a well-regulated body of 
PPEs. The marketing benefits of working closely with the state provide a strong incentive to 
do so, and the legal regulations enforced by the MVD provide a release valve for the 
exclusion from the protection market of PPEs that do not work with the state or are simply 
otherwise unreliable. If trust in the reliability of PPEs is high, then it can be expected that 
enlisting the services of a PPE will be common among clients with the means to do so. The 
number of clients who actually do so, however, will likely depend on how reliable the state’s 
physical and judicial protection services are. 
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4. A switch from an ISO to the state is uncommon. 
 A switch from an ISO’s protection to the state’s protection would entail the client 
removing itself from the ISO. Such a switch would appear difficult, if not impossible, as an 
unregulated ISO has far stronger means of keeping a profitable business under its 
protection than the business has of removing itself. Such an action might only be remotely 
possible in the case of a business that is no longer profitable enough to warrant an ISO’s 
attention. 
5. A switch from an ISO to a PPE is likely only when the benefits exceed the risks, the client 
is not engaged in illegal activities, and a suitably strong PPE can be found. 
 One of the operations undertaken by many PPEs is the removal of mafia (ISO) 
control from private businesses. There are three conditions that must be true for this to 
happen, however. First, the potential business benefits of removing ISO protection must 
exceed the risks of doing so. If a business has high profit potential then this is true. 
However, if the ISO is not engaged in extortion of any kind and/or the business is not highly 
profitable, then it likely that removing ISO protection will not be attempted in the first place. 
Second, the client must not be engaged in illegal activities. This is mandatory not only to 
ensure the cooperation of any legitimate PPE but also to ensure that the ISO does not have 
leverage to keep the client under its control. Third, a suitably strong PPE must be found. 
The state-PPE alliance that can be found in Russia is particularly adept at ISO removal 
primarily because it allows the PPE to combine its own physical protection power, required 
to shield the client against any repercussions, with the judicial capability of the state, which 
is required to discourage the ISO from attempting to carry out said repercussions (Volkov, 
2000). 
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Other Considerations 
 Of course, there might be other factors that could affect which type of protection a 
client chooses. An argument exists that, in the case of ISOs, the client’s desires may not be 
the driving factor in deciding whether or not a client enlists an ISO’s services. Evidence does 
exist to support the suggestion that ISOs actively seek out clients rather than the other way 
around. Businesses that undergo costly renovations, thus revealing an availability of capital, 
are more likely to be contacted by ISOs. If it is the ISO rather than the clients that drive the 
proposal of protection contracts, they would certainly be able to create the threats that would 
ensure such contracts are accepted by their clients (Frye, 2002b). If this general argument 
holds true, the strongest factors for determining whether or not a client chooses an ISO over 
another type of protection would be apparent wealth of the client and strength of the ISO in 
relation to available PPEs rather than what has already been suggested. 
Case Studies 
In order to test the validity of the enumerated expectations, the protection market in 
four different cities in 1996 will be examined. Moscow, as the center for both commerce and 
state authority in Russia, will serve as the Russian benchmark case to which other Russian 
cases can be compared. Smolensk, which offers relatively little state interference in 
business, semi-reliable courts, and MVD-regulated PPEs, will be another case. The third 
case will be Ulyanovsk, which also offers regulated PPEs but imposes increased state 
interference in business and courts that are less reliable than those in Smolensk. Warsaw, 
Poland, will also be examined in order to comparatively illustrate the effects of regulation on 
PPEs. Another post-communist city, Warsaw offers less government interference and more 
reliable courts than can be found in most of Russia. The PPEs of Poland are much less 
regulated than those of Russia, however, and as a result, are much less reliable. 
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 Many of the statistics used are adapted from Frye’s Private Protection in Russia and 
Poland. Some of his findings are reproduced here in Table 2.1. The number of inspection 
agencies and the inspections made per year will be considered, with the assumption that 
more inspection agencies doing the same job on multiple occasions is a symptom of 
regulation inefficiency and will raise the cost of doing business. When available, the 
percentage of businesses using the services of a PPE will also be used. ISO usage is 
extremely difficult to determine, as few clients will implicate themselves in having a 
relationship with a criminal organization. However, a rough statistic can be determined by 
asking clients if and how recently they have had any contact at all with an ISO. The 
assumption can be made that, if a client has had contact with an ISO within the six months 
prior to the survey, it is likely that the client has enlisted its protection services. 
Table 2.1 – State Regulation and Usage of Private Security Among Small Businesses, 1996 
 Moscow Smolensk Ulyanovsk Warsaw 
Inspections per Year 18.7 15.3 21.9 3.3 
Number of Inspection 
Agencies 
4.9 4.4 4.7 1.6 
Businesses 
Undergoing Renovation 
58% 84% 53% 90% 
PPE Usage 21% 58% 53% 35% 
Recent ISO Contact 23% 20% 24% 6% 
ISO Contact ever 42% 22% 65% 16% 
(Frye, 2002b: 577) 
Moscow 
 Businesses in Moscow were inspected by an average of 4.9 agencies on 18.7 
occasions per year, which is above average but not the highest among the cities polled. In 
the light of the business relations in Moscow mentioned earlier, it may be safe to assume 
that businessmen in Moscow did not put much trust in the ability of state courts to solve 
problems for them. Only 47 percent of Moscow businessmen believed that a state court 
would be able to resolve a dispute they had with another business partner (Frye, 2002b: 
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576). Finally, as Moscow is the center of MVD regulatory ability, it can be assumed that 
PPEs in Moscow were highly regulated, even for Russia. Thus, with court reliability at a 
medium level, high levels of costly government intervention in business, and high regulation 
of PPEs, one would expect that a client would be most likely to choose a PPE, followed by 
an ISO, with few choosing to rely solely on the state for protection. 
 The numbers, however, do not reflect this. Twenty-three percent of businessmen 
reported having recent contact with ISOs, which is one percentage point short of the highest 
result of all cities surveyed. Additionally, only 21 percent of businessmen reported enlisting 
the services of a PPE, which is the lowest of all cities. Even if one can assume that a client 
is not likely to be under both a PPE and an ISO in Russia and therefore that these two 
statistics do not overlap, the majority of businesses in Moscow relied solely on state 
protection. This will be addressed later. 
Smolensk 
 Smolensk has adopted a more liberal attitude toward business controls than some 
other Russian cities. Businesses reported an average of 4.4 government agencies doing 
15.3 inspections per year, which is the lowest number of all Russian cities surveyed. Fifty-
four percent trusted the government’s ability to resolve problems with other businessmen 
and, as Smolensk is a Russian city, it can be trusted that PPEs in Smolensk were highly 
regulated (Frye, 2002b). If businessmen in Smolensk experienced medium levels of trust in 
their courts, low levels of government business intervention, and high levels of PPE 
regulations, it can be expected that potential protection clients in the city would be most 
likely to contract a PPE. Some might rely solely on state protection, while relying on ISO 
protection would be uncommon. 
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 The numbers from Smolensk validate expectations. Fifty-eight percent of surveyed 
businessmen had contracted PPEs for protection – this is the highest number of any city 
surveyed. Only 20 percent had recent contact with an ISO, which is the lowest number in 
Russia. More strikingly, only 22 percent had ever had contact with an ISO at all, which is 
lower than the statistic for Moscow by half. The market for ISOs simply did not seem to 
thrive in Smolensk. The remaining businesses, it can be assumed, relied on the state for 
protection. 
Ulyanovsk 
 Ulyanovsk has gone the opposite direction from Smolensk in terms of business 
intervention. While the average number of state inspection agencies a business 
encountered – 4.7 – was slightly lower than that of Moscow, businesses in Ulyanovsk 
experienced an average of 21.9 inspections per year, the highest of any city surveyed. 
Citizens of Ulyanovsk seemed slightly more optimistic concerning the possibility of a state 
court resolving problems between business partners, with 64 percent believing that they 
could do so. However, only 24 percent believed that a court would resolve a problem in their 
favor if their property rights were violated by a state organization (Frye, 2002b). It can also 
be assumed that the PPEs of Ulyanovsk are as well-regulated as those of Moscow and 
Smolensk. Thus, Ulyanovsk offered businesses high levels of government intervention, 
either high or low levels of judicial reliability, depending on what kind of problem was being 
solved, and high levels of PPE regulation. If expectations hold true, many businesses would 
try to avoid government business regulations and thus be driven into the protection of ISOs. 
PPEs, well-regulated as they are anywhere in Russia, would also be a popular choice. Few 
would entrust their business solely to the state, especially if they did not trust the state to 
protect their rights. 
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 The statistics for Ulyanovsk confirm these expectations. Twenty-four percent of 
businesses had had recent contact with ISOs. While this is not particularly high, it is still the 
highest of any city surveyed. Additionally, 65 percent – by far the highest of any city – report 
having ever had contact with an ISO, meaning that ISOs saw the city as having high 
potential for clients seeking illegitimate protection. Fifty-three percent of clients had enlisted 
the services of a PPE, which is similar to the statistic from Smolensk. A relatively small 
number of businesses in Ulyanovsk relied solely on the state. 
Warsaw 
 The environment in Warsaw was different from that in a Russian city. Its economic 
plan was similar to that of Smolensk, only more liberalized. Businesses report an average of 
1.6 government agencies performing 3.3 inspections per year, which is a fraction of the 
government economic regulation in Russian cities. Furthermore, trust in state judicial 
institutions seem to be strong, and 80 percent of Warsaw businesses surveyed believed that 
they could rely on the courts to protect their rights in case of a dispute with a business 
partner (Frye, 2002b). 
 Warsaw differs most greatly from any Russian city on the matter of PPEs, however. 
As in Russia, private protection in Poland appeared shortly following the end of communism. 
Much like the rest of the new liberalized Polish economy, these PPEs had little regulation. 
Because of this, PPEs in Poland behaved very much like ISOs. There have been accounts 
of private security agents robbing banks, kidnapping, and taking hostages, sometimes while 
wearing the uniform of their employing organization. The Polish government has even 
considered PPEs at times to be a national security risk, as some heads of protection 
organizations have become informers for Western intelligence agencies (Los, 2005). 
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Because of weak government regulations of the PPE industry, PPEs were generally held in 
little higher regard than ISOs. 
 The unregulated PPE industry, combined with the trust of Warsaw businessmen in 
the state courts and the low levels of state intervention in business, should mean that the 
state is the primary supplier of security for clients in this city. The statistics reflect this: only 
35 percent of Warsaw businessmen contracted with a PPE, and 6 percent had had recent 
contact with an ISO. The rest, it can be assumed, relied solely on the state for protection. 
The striking statistic here, though, is the low number of clients that contract with ISOs 
compared to those that contract with PPEs. One possible explanation for this is that, with 
little regulation over the PPE industry, organizations that would otherwise act as ISOs find it 
more convenient to become PPEs. This would also be beneficial for their competition in the 
protection market, as the PPE title at least comes with some claim of legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
For most examples, the expectations developed earlier hold true. Moscow, however, 
proved to be an anomaly. Rather than PPEs being the dominant form of protection, followed 
by ISOs and then the state, as would be expected, the exact reverse proved to be true. One 
possible explanation for this is that, as Moscow is the capital and home to most of Russia’s 
enforcement bodies, government scrutiny is much more intense. This scrutiny would make it 
much more difficult to avoid the state protection contract by withholding taxes or entering 
into illegal deals. Another possible explanation is that, in a city as large and as commerce-
heavy as Moscow, the demand for PPE protection simply greatly outstrips the supply, 
accounting for the low percentage of businesses that employ PPEs for protection. 
 The argument that the active seeking out of clients by ISOs is a major driving force in 
the protection market, however, seems to be completely disproven. Warsaw and Smolensk, 
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the cities with the highest number of expensive business renovations undertaken, also have 
the lowest number of businesses that rely on ISOs for protection. 
The End of the 1990s – The State Returns 
 A number of dates have been named throughout the first two chapters. Perestroika 
began in 1986, which allowed for the first instances of legal private enterprise in the Soviet 
Union. In 1991, Yeltsin’s government resisted an attempted coup, and used the opportunity 
to disband the strongest sources of Soviet power, effectively bringing down the Soviet Union 
and beginning the economic and political reforms that would create the modern Russian 
state. The formation of private security companies was allowed in 1992, essentially creating 
legal competitors to the illegal organizations that were offering the personal and property 
protection services that the Russian state could not. A 1995 decree altered MVD regulation 
practices, with the result that PPEs would now work in concert with state enforcement 
bodies in offering protection services. Finally, on December 31, 1999 – the very end of the 
1990s – Yeltsin announced his resignation in favor of then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. 
 However, these dates do not divide the 1990s into distinct segments. One cannot 
simply say that the state disintegrated in 1991, gained its footing in 1995, and returned to 
power in 1999. While it is true that the state in 1992 was weaker and more decentralized 
than it had been in 1990, and that the state had again regained some authority by 1998, 
these trends are the results of interactions between a number of different parties vying for 
some sort of authority. Examining private security companies is a particularly effective way 
to track these trends, as they occupy a space in society that is created by the government’s 
failure to provide total protection to its citizens. The reasons behind this failure are complex, 
as are the reasons behind the state’s increasing ability to provide this protection toward the 
end of the 1990s. Yeltsin’s reforms undermined the law enforcement and judicial institutions 
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that provided protection, and the inability of the central government to monopolize authority 
weakened its ability to protect the rights, property, and physical security of its citizens. As 
per Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong’s conceptualization of the state-building process, a 
large number of elites competed for authority in Yeltsin’s Russia. Protection of the rights and 
property of the common citizen was not in the best interest of many of these elites, 
particularly the oligarchs and many regional governors, and the struggle for authority by 
non-state actors often produced a failure to protect citizens’ rights as a side effect. The most 
reasonable response to the question of why the state did not provide appropriate protection 
was that the institutions tasked with providing it could not do so, and the actors that could 
allow the institutions to do so either did not want to or simply had other priorities. This 
answer, as well as the political trends of the 21st century and their effects on private security, 
will be further explored in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER III 
PUTIN GETS THE JOB 
 
Introduction 
In determining the strength of the Russian state at the end of the twentieth century 
and the beginning of the twenty-first, it is perhaps helpful to identify two levels of competition 
for authority.4
 The first intention in this chapter is to determine what actors held authority in Russia 
in the late Yeltsin years and during Putin’s first presidential term, and what kind of state they 
built. The second goal is to examine the Putin state’s effects on the existence of private 
 The first of these is the competition within the formal national-level 
government structures between the executive and legislative branches of government. The 
second level of competition existed between the national government and external sources 
of power, such as non-state actors or even non-central government actors.  As Grzymala-
Busse and Jones Luong point out, non-state actors can wield just as much influence as 
state actors, depending on the source from which they derive their influence (Grzymala-
Busse and Jones Luong, 2002). Even if the central government is the only authority capable 
of influencing state policy decisions for example, power can still be balanced throughout the 
various governmental branches. Alternatively, power can concentrate in the executive 
branch, but state actors can still be unable to resist the influence of non-state actors, as was 
the case in Yeltsin’s Russia. 
                                                            
4 The term “authority” in the second chapter, as in the first chapter, is a reference to Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones Luong’s work, and refers to an actor’s ability to manipulate policy on the national level. 
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security. Two factors are necessary for the existence of private security. First, the state 
must, in some capacity, be failing to provide sufficient protection to its citizens, whether 
because it cannot or because it will not. Second, the state must allow private organizations 
to offer security services, again either because the state is too weak to prevent their 
existence or because it simply does not wish to prevent it. It will be argued that private 
security continues to exist through a combination of the above factors. Putin’s government 
was able to greatly improve its ability to offer to its citizens services that fall under the 
classification of protection. There are shortcomings in the completeness to which protection 
is offered, however. Namely, while a Russian citizen in 2004 was much more likely to have 
his property protected from his fellow citizen than was a Russian citizen in 1994, he was just 
as unlikely to find that this protection extended to safeguarding his property from the 
government. Putin’s regime is generally uncomfortable with non-governmental competition 
in any sphere, especially in spheres in which this competition has the capacity to limit the 
actions of the government. However, the Russian state has substituted regulation and soft 
power controls for direct ownership of private security, allowing the government, regardless 
of its strength, to effectively co-opt private security organizations and bring them under the 
influence of the MVD. Modern Russian PPEs offer effective protective services to those who 
are still not completely satisfied with the government’s ability to protect them against other 
citizens. However, they cannot be relied upon to protect citizens from the arbitrary actions of 
the state.  
Putin in Charge 
The Election 
 When Yeltsin resigned in 1999, Vladimir Putin, then the Prime Minister, became the 
acting President. He was seen by Yeltsin and his supporters as sufficiently loyal to continue 
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looking after their interests. However, Putin still had to face an election in May 2000 in order 
to gain the full Presidency, which he won with over half of the votes. McFaul notes four 
reasons why Putin was able to win this election. The first reason was the war in Chechnya. 
The first Chechen War, fought under Yeltsin, was a disaster. Independent media sources 
reported on the military’s poor performance and criticized the administration’s goals and 
conduct, greatly reducing public support. However, the second war was viewed by the 
Russian people as an instance of self-defense, as the Russian military offensive was in 
direct response to a Chechen incursion into Dagestan and then intensified in response to a 
series of apartment bombings in Russia in September 1999. The Russian forces relied 
heavily on air power, making the war seem cleaner from a Russian perspective, and the 
state conducted its own media coverage and propaganda campaign in order to maintain 
support for the war. As a result of this, public support for Putin’s government remained at 
around 60 percent throughout the 2000 election (McFaul, 2000). 
 The second reason for Putin’s victory was that he was a source of optimism. 
Whereas politics in the 1990s had seemed like a struggle between communism and 
anticommunism waged by old men, Putin was young and his politics were not well known, 
which allowed people to project their own political hopes for stabilization and a departure 
from the tumultuous 1990s. Third, Putin had no major political opposition, either from formal 
or informal sources. Other political parties were not organized enough to effectively oppose 
him, and alternate sources of authority, such as the oligarchs and other powerful actors who 
had supported Yeltsin, believed that Putin would look after their interests. Finally, Yeltsin’s 
early resignation pushed the election forward by three months, allowing Putin to pull off a 
victory even as his public approval was beginning to drop (McFaul, 2000). 
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Putin in Office 
 Hamish asserts that although Yeltsin’s supporters assumed that Putin would be loyal 
to them, Putin actually owed loyalty to three different groups that had helped him throughout 
his political career.  The first of these, the group that supported Putin’s succession of 
Yeltsin, is what Hamish calls Yeltsin’s “Family,” which consists of Yeltsin’s most immediate 
supporters and of the oligarchs who had secured Yeltsin’s loyalty through monetary and 
political support (Hamish, 2005: 30). The second and third groups were the Saint 
Petersburg-linked economic liberals and the security servicemen who had helped Putin in 
his political career. Each group wanted different, and sometimes contradictory, goals, and 
each group was capable of harming Putin’s support in some way. The “Family” wanted to be 
provided for, and for the concessions that they had obtained under Yeltsin to be preserved. 
The economic liberals, disappointed at Yeltsin’s state’s inability to provide for and protect its 
citizens, pushed strengthened rule of law and the improved climate for investment that it 
would provide. The security services lamented the fact that some individuals – particularly 
the oligarchs – were beyond the reach of the state’s law enforcement. To retain his 
Presidency, Putin would have to either appease all three groups, or see to it that they were 
not in position where they could wield any power against him (Hamish, 2005). 
 In addition to those of his supporters, Putin had his own goals that would reorder the 
Russian state with the President as the uncontested top of the pyramid. Steven Fish 
identifies four goals that Putin had upon attaining the Presidency: centralization of state 
power, the creation of a practical Russian state ideology, state control of communication, 
and the ordering of political competition. Putin conceived of the state ideology as what Fish 
calls “supraethnic, statist nationalism” based in the Presidency itself, the military, and the 
rule of law (Fish, 2001: 72). He also brought all national television stations under state 
authority, and some criticisms exist that censorship and monitoring of communication by 
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secret police, both prevalent during Soviet times, have returned in spite of being explicitly 
forbidden by Articles 23 and 29 of the Russian Constitution (Fish, 2001: 76). Additionally, 
new rules concerning political party registration have not only ordered political competition, 
but eliminated most parties and put the remaining ones under state control (Fish, 2001). 
Putin’s objective of consolidating power in the central Russian government, however, had 
the most important implications for the private security industry. 
In the Russia that Putin had inherited from Yeltsin, regional authorities wielded a 
great deal of power in their own localities. Any policy passed by the central government had 
to include concessions required by regional authorities, as taxes revenue went first to 
regional governors and only then was contributed to the national budget. Regional 
administrators acted with great personal freedom, often ignoring national laws and passing 
their own contradictory ones. Additionally, most power abuses happened between local 
authorities and their constituents. Reigning in these regional authorities, then, would serve 
the dual purpose of strengthening the rule of law and eliminating one of the major 
competitors to the authority of the central Russian government (Fish, 2001). In order 
increase his control over regional authorities, Putin issued a presidential decree almost 
immediately upon winning the 2000 election that divided Russia into seven large regions, 
based on preexisting military districts. Each of these districts was governed by a Presidential 
Representative, who dominated most of the politics in his respective district, and in turn was 
appointed by the President. Putin also pushed forward legislation that required regions to 
forward half of their tax revenue to the national government. This amount increased to 56 
percent in 2001 and 62 percent in 2002. Further 2000 reform, pushed through the Duma by 
Putin, allowed the President to fire governors. These measures broke most of the authority 
that regional governors had over the central government, disarming one of the main 
competitors for authority that Yeltsin had faced during the 1990s (Hamish, 2005: 34).   
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 Although Putin had disarmed the regional governors, he still had a major competitor 
for authority in the oligarchs. Yeltsin had been in debt to them for the aid they gave him in 
winning the 1996 election. Although Putin had had the oligarchs’ support in succeeding 
Yeltsin, he owed no such debt. His popularity had been high enough to where he could run 
for office without the support, monetary and otherwise, of the oligarchs (Hamish, 2005: 34). 
Aware of the political influence that the oligarchs had held in the 1990s, Putin announced 
even before his 2000 election that he would not tolerate intrusion into politics by anyone 
hoping to levy economic power for political power. In July of 2000, Putin met with 19 
oligarchs and announced to them that he would not look into gains made by any individual 
by taking advantage of the privatization process as long as they stayed out of politics. He 
stated, in his usual blunt manner, that the state had a cudgel, and if he had to use it, “it will 
be used only once, and right to the head” (Hamish, 2005: 37). The seriousness of this 
ultimatum was demonstrated when the mansion of Vladimir Gusinsky, who controlled the 
Media-Most media group that included several news outlets that were critical of the 
government, was raided by armed tax police. Gusinsky himself was ordered to repay $380 
million in loans to state-controlled Gazprom (Hamish, 2005).  
Other wealthy individuals, including Boris Berezovsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
were also targeted after they opposed Putin’s government. Berezovksy, whose own media 
group gave a new home to many of the personnel from Gusinsky’s now-dismantled Media-
Most, criticized Putin’s attempts at centralization. As a result, the state-owned 
Vneshekonombank pressured him into the repayment of his $100 million debt to the bank, 
and he lost his 49 percent stake of the state-owned television station ORT. In July 2004, 
Khodorkovsky, who controlled the oil company Yukos and had also been critical of Putin, 
was ordered to repay his company’s tax debt of $3.4 billion. Yukos could not do so, and it 
was declared bankrupt and its assets sold (Hamish, 2005). The message seemed to be that, 
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while past injustices might be tolerated, engaging in politics to challenge the Kremlin’s 
authority would not. 
The Rule of Law 
 Strengthening the rule of law5
 The judicial system in Russia experienced a number of changes during the Putin era, 
some of which were direct results of reforms and some of which were side effects of other 
changes. The first area that experienced change was the Constitutional Court, which hears 
claims concerning the violation of the Russian Constitution. Petitions can be made by the 
President, a sizeable group of legislators (20 percent or more of either parliamentary 
chamber), or regional governments. The court receives roughly 15,000 petitions a year. 
However, between 1995 and 2003, 88 percent of presidential petitions were heard by the 
court while only half of parliamentary petitions and a third of regional government petitions 
were heard. The court has been given more authority in the Putin era, but it has largely used 
this authority to emphasize Putin’s own control over Russian politics. Although the purpose 
of the court is to ensure that no body in the country is above the Constitution, it seems that 
 was one of Putin’s stated goals for Russia, and a 
much-desired goal for the economic liberals who had supported him. In some aspects, this 
goal has been achieved. Reforms to the judicial system have greatly improved the 
performance of the courts in dealing with the vast majority of cases presented to them. 
However, as demonstrated in the prosecution of the oligarchs who had made the mistake of 
challenging the Kremlin, the law still does not protect all Russians.  Kathryn Hendley argues 
that a dual system exists in Russia, in which “mundane cases are handled in accordance 
with the prevailing law,” but “the outcomes of cases that attract the attention of those in 
power can be manipulated to serve their interests” (Hendley, 2007: 99). 
                                                            
5 Kathryn Hendley’s definition of the rule of law, which will be used here, is a system with “an independent 
judiciary that applies the law in an even-handed manner to all who come before it” (Hendley, 2007: 99). 
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the President is just a little less beholden to the Constitution than any other body (Hendley, 
2007). 
 The General Jurisdiction courts also experienced a change. These courts handle any 
case that is not handled by the Constitutional Court or arbitrazh courts, meaning that they 
handle the vast majority of all judicial cases in Russia. The case load has increased by 
roughly 10 percent per year since Putin took office, but the increase comes from civil claims 
rather than criminal cases, which have actually decreased. Hendley suggests that this 
statistic reveals a complicated truth in Russian society: although overall trust in the court 
system has not increased as quickly as has trust in other aspects of government, more 
Russians are taking cases to court (Hendley, 2007: 111).  
 Arbitrazh courts, which hear cases between firms rather than between individuals, 
have seen two important changes in the Putin era. First, between 1994 and 2004, the 
number of cases heard by the court grew by nearly 600 percent, which means that Russian 
businesses are increasingly seeing the court system as an effective recourse for solving 
problems. Second, cases heard by arbitrazh are increasingly between firms and the state 
rather than between two firms. Hendley cites two reasons for this development. The first is 
that Russia’s overall economic recovery has reduced the instances in which firms need help 
in resolving debt recovery cases. The second is that citizens are starting to see suing the 
state as a viable option (Hendley, 2007: 115). Outwardly this seems like a contradiction to 
the state-society relationship that Putin has fostered with his reforms in which the state is 
unassailable. However, suing the state through a state-sponsored channel can hardly be 
considered genuine competition for authority. 
 Although the most important changes in the courts were largely side effects of other 
changes in Putin-era Russia, Putin pushed for some legal reforms that directly targeted a 
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number of areas. The old criminal code, for example, dated from the Khrushchev era. The 
new code required police to obtain search warrants and limited pretrial detention. New labor 
codes allowed managers more freedom to dismiss workers and also made it more difficult 
for managers to delay wage payments. The latter law was pushed forward despite protests 
from communists and trade unionists. A 2004 law that monetized pension benefits was 
passed, despite mass protests from pensioners who stood to lose much of the value of their 
pensions. A further law, passed in 2005, requires the re-registration of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and likely makes registration much more difficult for NGOs that do not 
align with the government’s goals. The clear message of these reforms, Hendley argues, is 
that “the fledgling experiment with a law-making process in which the views of society are 
reflected and respected is over” (Hendley, 2007: 105). 
 Two common themes appear in Putin’s reforms. The first of these is that the average 
Russian is more protected now than he or she was for most of the 1990s. The business 
atmosphere has improved and, although Russians still do not completely trust the justice 
system, they seem to trust its ability to protect their rights more than they did during the 
Yeltsin era. The second trend is that Putin’s government does not tolerate competition. He 
weakened or eliminated the threat from the oligarchs and other informal elites who had done 
particularly well in the competition for authority in Russia in the 1990s, as well as reigned in 
opposing political parties. The Kremlin’s competitors had fallen like so many stalks of corn to 
a scythe. Additionally, he sent a clear message to civil society that, although the government 
would do its best to provide a stable environment for its citizens in which their rights were 
protected, independence from the Kremlin would not be acceptable. 
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Private Security in Putin’s Russia  
During the Yeltsin era, the existence of private security was allowed for two reasons. 
The state law enforcement and judicial bodies did not provide adequate protection, creating 
the demand for private security, and the state tolerated a de-monopolization of its security 
provision, allowing for the supply of private security personnel. However, in Putin’s Russia, 
the opposite seemed to be true on both counts. By strengthening the rule of law and 
improving the overall economy, Putin eliminated many of the strongest reasons for which a 
business would hire a private security organization. Additionally, the existence of private 
security industry in which armed firms offer many of the same services that the state offers 
seems to go against Putin’s centralization ideology. One would imagine that the private 
security industry would shrink, if not entirely disappear. However, the opposite has been 
true, as shown in Table 3.1. In 2000, 7,693 PPEs existed, employing 245,807 employees. In 
2003, the number of firms had increased to 12,952, and in 2006, 21,768 firms existed and 
employed 733,311 personnel. Far from shrinking, the private security industry, or at least its 
legal side, grew almost three times over in six years (Margieva, 2008). 
Table 3.1 – PPE Expansion after 2000 
Year 2000 2003 2006 
PPEs in 
Existence 
7,693 12,952 21,768 
PPE 
Employees 
245,807 449,929 733,311 
(Margieva, 2008) 
One possible explanation for the expansion rather than shrinkage of the private 
security market is that PPEs began to offer their clients more effective and possible illegal 
services beyond what the state could or would offer, and the state – particularly the MVD – 
was powerless to further regulate them. This seems unlikely, though, as the state under 
Putin seemed to be if anything more capable of and willing to regulate than before. Putin 
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had strengthened and centralized Russia’s security ministries, including the MVD (Hamish, 
2005: 35, 36). It also seems unlikely that extreme regulations caused PPEs to offer a more 
Kremlin-friendly set of services, as no such extreme regulations seem to exist.  
An adequate answer would explain why PPEs continued to offer desirable services 
that the government did not offer, but also did not have an antagonistic relationship with the 
authorities. The former point can be satisfied by examining the types of services that were in 
demand prior to 2000 and after 2000. In Putin’s Russia, improved economic conditions 
meant that business fraud and unrecoverable debt were not as prevalent as they had been 
in Yeltsin’s Russia. This change, combined with the increased effectiveness of Russian 
courts, meant that debt recovery and business research were no longer the most appealing 
services that PPEs could offer their clients. However, if the rate of business misdealing 
decreased, the violent crime rate did not. As shown in Table 3.2, registered occurrences of 
robbery, serious assault, and murder/attempted murder stayed high even during Putin’s 
term in office. During the same time, references to PPEs in newspaper articles began to shift 
from a focus on their ability to solve business problems to their ability to offer physical 
protection. It seems likely, then, that PPEs began to offer more physical security-based 
services on their own accord in response to market demands.   
The high crime rate explains why the demand for protection services remained high 
after 2000. However, an additional factor is needed to explain why an antagonistic 
relationship between the MVD and private security companies did not result in repressive 
regulations or the outright closure of the private security industry. It will be argued here that 
through the use of soft power controls, the MVD created a system in which state-friendly 
PPEs succeeded in the private security marketplace, and those PPEs that did not cooperate 
with the MVD were eventually run out of business. This system transformed the private 
security industry from an independent and potentially threatening industry to one whose 
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existence was approved of and even appreciated by state structures. The nature of soft 
power will be explained, as well as its effectiveness in co-opting private security firms in 
Russia. 
Table 3.2 – Registered Crimes (in Thousands) in the Late 1990s and Early 2000s 
Crime 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total registered 
crimes 
2397.3 2581.9 3001.7 2952.4 2968.3 2526.3 2756.4 2893.8 
Murder and 
attempted murder 
29.3 29.6 31.1 31.8 33.6 32.3 31.6 31.6 
Robbery 112.1 122.4 139.0 132.4 148.8 167.3 198.0 251.4 
Armed/Violent 
Robbery 
34.3 38.5 41.1 39.4 44.8 47.1 48.7 55.4 
(Ezhegodnik, 2003; Ezhegodnik, 2006) 
 
Soft Power 
 Although the usage of soft power is not new, Joseph Nye introduced the concept to 
the realm of International Relations in 1990. Power, he says, is the ability to make someone 
do something that he would otherwise not do (Nye, 2004: 2). He argues for a specific 
conception of power as a situational relationship rather than an inherent quality. Although an 
actor may hold the most power in one situation, its sources of power may fail it in another.  
His example is of the United States in the Vietnam War. Although few would attempt to 
argue that the United States was not more powerful than Vietnam, the latter prevailed in the 
conflict, largely because the former failed to apply its power correctly in the situational 
context. Another metaphor that Nye offers illustrates the situational character of power 
further: a schoolyard bully has power over other children on the playground, but this power 
is not as effective in the classroom (Nye, 2004). 
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 Additionally, coercive power requires a large amount of strength in order to affect 
even an incomplete measure of obedience. Nye argues that the United States is the current 
leader in both military and economic might (Nye, 2004: 4). However, citing the United State’s 
inability to unilaterally affect international trade regulations, stop terrorism, curb international 
crime, affect climate change, or stop the spread of disease, he claims that this dominance in 
the traditional sources of influence in world affairs does not grant the United States complete 
control over these affairs. 
Nye introduces the concept of soft power to solve this flaw in the traditional 
understanding of power. Hard power consists of inducements or threats, military or 
economical, by one state to encourage another state toward the first state’s goals. Soft 
power, he argues, is the ability of the first state to attract the second state to want the same 
outcomes that the first state wants. As Nye says, soft power “co-opts people rather than 
coerces them” (Nye 2004, 5). In a later writing on the subject, Nye uses the example of 
Europe’s arms embargo on China to illustrate the effectiveness of this type of power 
relationship (Nye, 2007: 167). This embargo, itself a form of hard power, was nearly lifted in 
2005 due to the possibility of greater market access for European states. However, the 
passing of legislation against Taiwanese secession reaffirmed European perceptions of 
China as an authoritarian state, thus undermining China’s soft power and causing Europe to 
reconsider. However, China’s attractiveness – in this situation, the greater access to 
Chinese markets that would be allowed by being on China’s good side – was enough to 
cause European powers to considering abandoning their ideological stances and do 
business with China. 
Nye’s interest in soft power is in its relevance to relationships between sovereign 
states. However, it can be argued that soft power can play an equally large role in domestic 
politics. If one actor does not enjoy complete institutional control over another, then both 
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actors can be thought of as two autonomous entities enjoying variable amounts of self-
determination. This conception is just as true with sovereign states as it is with organizations 
operating within one state. During Yeltsin’s term in office, the Russian state only enjoyed 
nominal control over various aspects of Russian society. Yeltsin’s concessions to the 
oligarchs and to the regional governors more closely mimicked international diplomatic 
negotiation than they did the interactions between a strong, centralized state and its 
subordinates. 
The sources of hard power and soft power in domestic relations are different than 
those in international relations. Although the threat of physical or economic repercussions is 
implicit in a government’s dealings with domestic actors, it would be considered an extreme 
circumstance for a government to regularly use its military to coerce private businesses into 
cooperation. However, by successfully building lawmaking and law enforcement institutions, 
a government can coerce domestic cooperation through regulation and enforcement. 
It is helpful to picture the relationship between the Russian government and private 
security in the same way. Theoretically speaking, if the government were to decide to exert 
its hard power to eliminate legal private security services, the task would go to a number of 
government institutions. The law would need to be amended, which would be tasked to the 
legislative and executive bodies of the state. The MVD would have to disarm and disband 
existing PPEs and deal with after-effects, such as the defection of former private security 
employees to criminal organizations. This type of control would require a level of strength6
                                                            
6 Strength here refers to any quality that helps an organization achieve results, such as manpower, 
organizational cohesiveness, legal support, and the backing of higher government institutions. 
 at 
all levels of government involved. Regulation, also a form of hard power, was a much more 
effective way to exert control over the private security industry, as it requires less power on 
the part of the government agencies involved. Like any form of hard power, though, 
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regulation requires a certain level of strength on the part of the government in order to 
enforce regulations and punish offenders. 
The 1995 regulations on private security seem to have introduced a measure of soft 
power into the relationship between the state and private security. The private security 
market is competitive, and in any large city in Russia, hundreds of PPEs will be competing 
for the same clients. In 1997, in the suburbs of Moscow alone, 224 PPEs offered their 
services to potential clients (Flyus, 1997). Most PPEs offer roughly similar services, with the 
only difference being the quality of service. The 1995 regulations had two major effects that 
were emphasized by these conditions. The first effect is that the MVD began working 
alongside certain PPEs. The MVD works only with PPEs that closely followed regulations 
and were considered to be cooperative with the state. Working with the MVD allows a PPE 
to use many of the MVD’s resources and, more importantly, allows the PPE to advertise this 
highly desirable relationship. A potential client knows that an MVD-endorsed PPE is 
trustworthy and effective. The second effect is that the MVD began targeting PPEs for 
license revocation more aggressively. Targeted PPEs were generally small and usually 
underperforming. The combination of these two effects meant that while the MVD would not 
immediately shut down PPEs that did not cooperate with the state, the lack of MVD support 
generally meant that such PPEs could not compete with PPEs that did cooperate with the 
state. An uncooperative PPE, then, would soon find itself in the financial position where it 
would be investigated by the MVD and likely have its operating license revoked.  
A clear example of this occurred involving the MOST Security Group in 2000. The 
service, a PPE that protected much of the property belonging to toppled oligarch Gusinsky’s 
media and banking groups, was subjected to an unscheduled MVD audit. Upon discovering 
that the PSS had violated a single regulation (the wall of the company’s firearms cabinet 
was several millimeters too thin), the company’s firearms license was revoked and its 
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weapons confiscated. Although a court later ruled against the MVD action and ordered the 
return of all licenses and firearms, the MVD’s actions are an example of the potentially 
selective nature of the MVD’s regulation of the private security industry (Ukolov, 2000). If the 
PPE had permanently lost its firearms license, its market even to its founding companies 
would have dropped significantly. The opposite of this scenario can occur, however, as in 
the case of Yuri Stenin, the director of the PPE Sokol-YUNS. His PPE was convicted in 
2002 of illegal wiretapping and the interception of pager communications, and was in danger 
of losing its operating license. However, in light of the PPE’s longstanding good relationship 
with the MVD, the penalty was reduced to three years’ imprisonment for Stenin himself, from 
which he was later pardoned (Zapodinskaya, 2002). Sokol-YUNS was permitted to break 
regulations with little more than a small amount of negative publicity thanks to its positive 
relationship with the MVD.  
The post-1995 regulations, then, are a form of soft power. The state does not exert 
control over the private security industry by having the MVD shut down any company that 
does not cooperate with the state. Being able to advertise MVD cooperation, however, is a 
huge incentive for a PPE to voluntarily cooperate with the state. Theoretically, PPEs in such 
a system would be self-regulating in that they would only offer services that do not conflict 
with the state’s desires, and only to clients of which the state approves, for fear of having 
their MVD support revoked. Knowing that PPEs are self-regulating in such a way would also 
alleviate some of the concern that the state might experience over the existence of an 
industry in which armed firms offer services similar to those offered by the state. To confirm 
this hypothesis, though, the activities of private security after 1995, and particularly in the 
Putin era, will be examined. It will show that the relationship between the MVD and PPEs 
tightened during the Putin era, leaving less room for the operation of PPEs that did align 
with the state. 
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Developments in Putin-era Private Security 
 An ideal study of the effects of the politics of the new millennium on the private 
security industry would be similar to the one included in the previous chapter, which studied 
the effects of the 1995 regulations. However, the data necessary to perform such a study is 
unavailable. Specifically, a survey of business owners concerning government protection 
reliability and private security usage until around 2004, at the end of Putin’s first term in 
office would be useful, as would MVD statistics on PPE regulation and organized crime 
strength. In the absence of such information, newspapers offer a valuable source of 
information and analysis concerning developments in Russia and their effect on private 
security. Developments will be treated on a per-case basis. The event itself will be analyzed, 
and the probable effects on the private security industry will be argued for. 
State Private Security 
 Throughout this paper, the state has largely been treated as a body that ideally gives 
protection equally to all of its clients. Although in practice different citizens may find that the 
law protects their property differently, all citizens are promised a certain level of physical and 
property protection by the law enforcement bodies of the state. However, the Department of 
Non-Departmental Security (or UVO, for Upravlenie Vnevedomstvennoj Okhrany) of the 
MVD behaves much like a private security organization. Originally founded in 1952 as a 
Soviet institution, the modern Russian incarnation offers property protection services, 
generally in the form of guarding apartments or places of business, to paying customers 
(Upravlenie Vnevedomstvennoj Okhrany pri GUVD po g. Moskve, 2011). 
 Although this service existed throughout much of the Soviet era and the entirety of 
the post-Soviet era, it has been left untreated by this discussion so far because, throughout 
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the 1990s, it did not offer effective competition to PPEs or ISOs. Private security companies 
were desirable because they offered debt recovery and business research services, which 
the UVO did not. However, as the Russian court system became more effective at solving 
business problems at the end of the 1990s, demand increased for property and personal 
protection services rather than for debt recovery and business research, and the UVO was 
able to compete with PPEs and ISOs in this field.  
The UVO offers some advantages over PPEs. Their services are generally cheaper 
– one 1998 estimate says that a security guard from a PPE costs roughly $4.50 to $7.00 per 
hour, depending on his experience, while a UVO security guard costs about $2.50 to $3.00 
per hour. Additionally, as part of the MVD, the UVO has better access to not only MVD 
resources and equipment, but also to state policy makers. This latter point has not seemed 
to give the UVO a major advantage over PPEs, however, as RUSA – the Russian Union of 
Security Agencies, an advocacy union of private security companies – has proved capable 
of lobbying policy makers just as well as the UVO can (Romanov and Borogan, 1998). 
A popular opinion is that UVO and private security have different markets. Sergei 
Goncharov, the chairman of RUSA, said that the UVO should concern itself with public 
properties rather than profitable private businesses (Romanov and Borogan, 1998).  Basic 
protection from intruders at a low price, which is UVO’s specialty, fits the needs of 
apartments and schools, which often choose UVO protection. The UVO is the discount 
option, though, and any profitable business that desires high-quality protection will likely 
choose the services of a PPE over the UVO (Shiryaev, 2002). Additionally, whereas the 
UVO is funded by the MVD’s budget, PPEs are subject to budget discipline and market 
forces. In order to make their services seem more attractive than those of the UVO, some 
PPEs offer to replace any property stolen while a member of that PPE is on watch, which 
UVOs do not do (Sojko, 2001). Although PPEs do view the UVO as competition, the UVO 
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does not seem to be genuinely keeping the private security industry in check, and does not 
function as a form of MVD control over private security. 
Terrorist Attacks 
 In September 1999, a series of bombings attributed to Chechen separatists took 
place in Moscow, Volgodonsk, and Ryazan, killing several hundred civilians. Although a 
shopping center in Moscow was attacked, most of the targets were apartment buildings 
(Titov, 2002). The homicide rate, as well as the number of total registered crimes had begun 
to drop from their peak levels in the early 1990s (Varese, 2001: 19, 20). However, the 
bombings introduced terrorism as a potential threat to the average Russian, as well as 
revealed the state’s security structure’s inability to adequately protect its citizens. Both of 
these revelations had a positive effect for the private security industry, and many PPEs 
recognized the potential to take advantage of the situation. In Moscow, many PPEs provided 
pairs of guards free of charge to the MVD in order to assist with security patrols. 
Representatives of the private protection industry then leveraged the increased demand for 
added protection, as well as the demonstrated loyalty of the industry to its enforcement 
partners in the MVD, to petition the Duma for greater empowerments (Nikitina, 1999). 
The private security industry did receive some concessions from lawmakers in the 
form of greater powers to aid in law enforcement, including the right to carry firearms in 
public places and the right to request and check individuals’ official identification 
documentation. The most important new empowerment, however, was the right to detain 
and use force against individuals who resist arrest, a right which had previously been denied 
to private enforcers. The Moscow-based independent newspaper Nezavisimaia Gazeta 
questioned the wisdom of such an empowerment, suggesting that nothing would stop one 
PPE from using this power against the operatives of a competing PPE (Nikitina, 1999). 
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However, this misuse of power may not be entirely against the interests of the MVD. 
Although all PPEs are permitted to forcibly detain potential criminals, they lack holding 
facilities and are still bound by strict laws concerning the degree of violence that can be 
used in detaining suspects. MVD cooperation is needed in order to detain an individual, and 
one imagines that MVD enforcers might be more tolerant toward cases of excessive 
violence by PPEs that have a history of supporting the MVD. Although the new regulations 
concerning the private security company applied to all companies equally, they may have 
given PPEs that cooperate with the state an advantage over those that did not. 
If the 1999 terrorist attacks suggested to Russian citizens that the state might not be 
capable of protecting them, the 2004 attack on a school in Beslan reinforced the idea. On 
September 1, 2004 – the first day of school – Chechen militants entered a school in Beslan, 
North Ossetia, and took roughly 1000 students and adults hostage. After a three-day 
standoff between the militants and the Russian police along with elements of the Russian 
military, a disastrous rescue operation resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians, many of 
whom were children (Beslan, 2004). Many Russians saw the tragedy as a failure on the part 
of the Russian state to protect its citizens (Sergievskij, 2004). The protection of schools by 
the state, or by the UVO in many instances, was no longer enough for many parents. 
Although protection by PPEs is out of the price range for many schools, roughly half of 
Moscow schools had hired security guards from PPEs by September 6, 2004, while only 80 
used the services of the UVO. Most of the money for protection services in schools is raised 
by parents, who often contribute a certain amount every month to be used for security 
services (Babkova, 2004). Although a pair of security guards is not likely to stop an armed 
attack on a school, such as the one that occurred in Beslan, trained security guards are 
capable of watching for anything suspicious that might lead to such an attack (Zenkovich, 
2004). 
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The threat of terrorism may be one of the most important reasons for which the 
private security market continued to expand in the 2000s. It exposed an area of weakness in 
the state security structure – namely, the inability of the state to fully protect its citizens from 
terrorism – and the prompt assistance that many PPEs gave to the MVD gave the industry 
as a whole the leverage it needed to defend itself against further attempts to restrict the 
ability of security companies to offer their services. 
Gun Control Laws 
 On November 13, 1996, the State Duma adopted the federal law “On Weapons.” The 
law was intended to regulate weapons trade and possession in Russia, particularly among 
civilians, but it also had a major effect on the private security industry. For the purposes of 
gun control, private security organizations were classified as civilian carriers with limited 
additional rights. Private security guards had to obtain licenses to carry firearms on duty and 
could not carry them off duty. Firms could own certain types of pistols with magazines 
smaller than ten rounds but could not own anything more powerful, although they could rent 
shotguns from the MVD (Ob Oruzhii, 1996). 
 Gun control has become stricter since 1996. In 2002, the MVD lobbied the Duma for 
more regulations concerning ownership and usage of firearms among private security 
companies, which they subsequently received. In December 2002, the Duma passed a law 
requiring the creation of automated databases with records of equipment, especially 
firearms, owned by private security companies. The licensing process for firearms permits 
for private security personnel also became more difficult, requiring documented training at 
MVD-approved shooting facilities (Ofitsialnie Materiali, 2002). 
 Gun control laws are a particular effective way for the MVD to hold power over 
private security companies. By tightening gun control laws, the state can reduce the overall 
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effectiveness of the private security industry – the MVD already has access to much more 
powerful weaponry than a PPE is allowed to use. However, the policy of allowing or even 
requiring private protection companies to rent weaponry from the MVD seems to be an 
effective way to increase the effectiveness of state-supportive PPEs over non-state-
supportive PPEs. A potential client would likely choose a well-armed PPE over an unarmed 
or lightly armed one. Since, one would imagine, a good relationship is required between a 
PPE and the MVD before the latter will rent weapons to the former, such a weapon rental 
policy would grant strong benefits to any PPE that upheld such a relationship with the MVD. 
PPE Unions   
 The Smolensk-based newspaper Rabochi Put reported the founding of the PPE 
union “Garant” in 2001. The union, which was formed in response to growing public concern 
over legal infractions committed by PPE personnel, works with the MVD, lobbies for PPE 
interests in government policy-making bodies, solves disputes between members, and 
recommends well-performing PPEs to potential clients. Garant is only open to PPEs of high 
character, and its membership as of the end of November, 2001, consisted of 9 Smolensk 
PPEs (Sojko, 2001). 
The newspaper article implies that PPE unions were being experimented with in 
different cities. RUSA, a PPE union with national scope, was already in existence, but it 
differs from Garant in that the latter was founded at the initiative of the FSB, and its 
members are expected to assist the FSB with counterintelligence, counter-terrorist, and anti-
organized crime work, as well as be generally supportive to the MVD’s law enforcement 
efforts (Sojko, 2001). Garant and similar PPE unions have important implications for the 
relationship between the state and the private security industry. Membership in such a union 
is beneficial to a PPE, as the PPE will be recommended to potential clients as an effective 
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and professionally-run company. However, cooperation with the MVD and the FSB are 
mandatory in order to join the union, making it an effective tool for state control of private 
security. 
Employee Regulation 
As the size of the private security industry grew, concern mounted that PPEs were 
hiring and potentially arming inexperienced and unqualified personnel rather than 
experienced ex-state security personnel. Some PPEs did exploit a loophole that allowed 
untrained or young security guards to work without a license for a period of time, which 
allowed them to hire a large number of security guards for a low cost (Panchenko, 2002). In 
response to this, the State Duma passed a law in 2002 that increased the accountability by 
individual security guards for legal infractions made while on duty and increased the quality 
of training required (Ofitsialnie Materialy, 2002). However, the effects of this legislation are 
unclear, as the number of personnel working in the private security company continued to 
increase at a high rate throughout the 2000s. 
Conclusion 
 The role of private security changed in the late 1990s and 2000s in response to both 
government pressure and a changing environment. A lower tolerance for competition with 
state authorities resulted in stricter firearms laws, restricted services that could be offered by 
PPEs, and tighter control over licensing and hiring processes for PPEs. An improved judicial 
system as well as a strengthened central state meant that dishonest business practices, 
which had generated much of the demand for private security in the 1990s, were not as 
prevalent in the 2000s. However, despite these changes, the private security industry found 
a way to make itself acceptable to state authorities and its services desirable to potential 
clients. The private security industry was made more acceptable to state authorities not by 
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its own initiative but by the actions of the state. By enacting soft power controls – 
specifically, by giving a strong market advantage to PPEs that cooperate with the state – the 
MVD was able to use existing market forces to encourage cooperation with the state by 
driving uncooperative PPEs out of business. In the private security industry, as in many 
aspects of Putin’s Russia, loyalty to the state is rewarded more than is adherence to the law. 
 The private security industry in turn was able to take advantage of the climate of 
insecurity following the 1999 and 2004 terrorist attacks to offer its protective services to 
clients who were suddenly unsure of the state’s ability to protect them. Private security also 
likely benefited greatly from the general expansion of the Russian economy during Putin’s 
time in office, which would have created a larger base of small and medium businesses with 
the money to hire private security. This new market for security, as well as the always-
existent desire of businesses to have an extra measure of security more than the state is 
willing or able to provide, allowed the private security industry to continue to grow 
throughout the 2000s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
PRIVATE SECURITY FOR PUBLIC GOOD 
 
Although Perestroika allowed the legal formation of private enterprises, these 
businesses were on their own in terms of protection. The prevailing attitude was that that the 
state was only responsible for defending its own property. To an extent, this attitude seemed 
to continue into post-Communist Russian society. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, 
shortcomings in the state’s ability or willingness to protect the rights, property, and physical 
safety of its citizens produced a demand for private organizations that were able to do so. 
The 1992 law that allowed the creation of private security companies essentially provided a 
legal channel by which private organizations could provide the protection services that 
criminal organizations had already been providing for years. 
Between 1992 and 1995, criminal organizations were still best suited to provide 
private protection services to paying clients. However, the 1995 regulations on the private 
security industry transformed legal private protection enterprises into trusted professional 
organization with close ties to the state security structure. Rewarded for their cooperative 
behavior with an MVD endorsement, many private protection enterprises were able to utilize 
state resources to reduce organized crime’s hold on the Russian economy. 
By the end of the tumultuous first half of the 1990s, Yeltsin had consolidated the 
power of the central Russian government in the Presidency. However, he still owed his 
political survival to other actors such as the oligarchs and the regional leaders, and was 
unable to assert his authority free of their influence. Putin, on the other hand, was able to 
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bring competing actors under the control of the Kremlin, and utilized the framework laid by 
Yeltsin to centralize all political authority in the President. In much the same way, the 1995 
regulations on private security ordered the private security industry but also introduced the 
framework that the Putin-era MVD would use to subordinate PPEs to the state security 
structure. Soft power controls utilized existing market forces to reward PPEs that cooperated 
with the MVD and to punish those that did not. 
 As Putin’s reforms reduced the demand for property protection from third-party 
security providers and simultaneously reduced the state’s tolerance for them, however, the 
private security market continued to grow. During the 1990s, demand for private security 
was fed by poor business conditions and low faith in the state’s ability to solve disputes; 
however, as the economy improved and trust in the courts gradually increased, arbitration 
and debt recovery services became a less important part of private security companies’ 
offerings. At the same time, though, a relatively unchanged crime rate, an expanding 
economy, and growing fear over terrorist threats fueled the demand for physical security and 
encouraged PPEs to increase their offerings in that area. Additionally, increasingly effective 
soft power controls during the Putin period induced PPEs to cooperate with the MVD and 
align themselves with the goals of the state. The resulting private security industry consisted 
primarily of PPEs that continued to offer in-demand physical security services but were also 
not independent enough to be a potential threat to Kremlin authority. In fact, modern 
Russian PPEs often serve as reserve power for the MVD in maintaining public order and 
security.   
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